THE ART OF WAR

			       by Sun Tzu


Chapter 1 : Estimates

	War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or
death, the road either to survival or to ruin.  Hence, it is imperative that it
be studied thoroughly.
	Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and
make comparisons of the various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order
to ascertain the results of a war.  The first of these factors is politics; the
second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth,
doctrine.  Politics means the thing which causes he people to be in harmony
with their ruler so that they will follow him in disregard of their lives and
without fear of any danger.  Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat,
fine days and rain, and change of seasons.  Terrain means distances, and refers
to whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty and to whether it is
open or constricted, and influences your chances of life or death.  The
commander stands for the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence,
courage, and strictness.  Doctrine is to be understood as the organization of
the army, the gradations of rank among the officers, the regulations of supply
routes, and the provision of military materials to the army.
	These five fundamental factors are familiar to every general.  Those
who master them win; those who do not are defeated.  Therefore, in laying
plans, compare the following seven elements, appraising them with the utmost
care.

	1. Which ruler is wise and more able?
	2. Which commander is more talented?
	3. Which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain?
	4. In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
	5. Which troops are stronger?
	6. Which army has the better-trained officers and men?
	7. Which army administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened
	and correct way? 

	By means of these seven elements, I shall be able to forecast which
side will be victorious and which will be defeated.
	The general who heeds my counsel is sure to win.  Such a general should
be retained in command.  One who ignores my counsel is certain to be defeated.
Such a one should be dismissed.
	Having paid attention to my counsel and plans, the general must create
a situation which will contribute to their accomplishment.  By "situation" I
mean he should take the field situation into consideration and act in
accordance with what is advantageous.
	All warfare is based on deception.  Therefore, when capable of
attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity.
When near the enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it
seem that you are near.  Hold out baits to lure the enemy.  Strike the enemy
when he is in disorder.  Prepare against the enemy when he is secure at all
points.  Avoid the enemy for the time being when he is stronger.  If your
opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him.  If he is arrogant, try to
encourage his egotism.  If the enemy troops are well prepared after
reorganization, try to wear them down.  If they are united, try to sow
dissension among them.  Attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear
where you are not expected.  These are the keys to victory for a strategist.
It is not possible to formulate them in detail beforehand.
	Now, if the estimates made before a battle indicate victory, it is
because careful calculations show that your conditions are more favorable than
those of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful
calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle are fewer.  With more
careful calculations, one can win; with less, one cannot.  How much less chance
of victory has one who makes no calculations at all!  By this means, one can
foresee the outcome of a battle.  


Chapter 2 : Waging War

	In operations of war-when one thousand fast four-horse chariots one
thousand heavy chariots, and one thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when
provisions are transported for a thousand li; when there are expenditures at
home and at the front, and stipends for entertainment of envoys and
advisers-the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and
armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day.  One hundred thousand
troops may be dispatched only when this money is in hand.
	A speedy victory is the main object in war.  If this is long in coming,
weapons are blunted and morale depressed.  If troops are attacking cities,
their strength will be exhausted.  When the army engages in protracted
campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short.  When your weapons are
dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the
chieftains of the neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act.
In that case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous
consequences that ensue.  Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war, we
have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.  for there has never
been a protracted war which benefited a country.  Therefore, those unable to
understand the evils inherent in employing troops are equally unable to
understand the advantageous ways of doing so.
	Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or
more that two provisionings.  They carry military equipment from the homeland,
but rely on the enemy for provisions.  Thus, the army is plentifully provided
with food.
	When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is due to
distant transportation; carrying supplies for great distances renders the
people destitute.  Where troops are gathered, prices go up.  When prices rise,
the wealth of the people is drained away.  When wealth is drained away, the
people will be afflicted with urgent and heavy exactions.  With this loss of
wealth and exhaustion of strength, the households in the country will be
extremely poor and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated.  As to government
expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and
helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen,
and wagons will amount to 60 percent of the total.
	Hence, a wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for
one zhong of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own and
one shi of the enemy's fodder to twenty shi of one's own.
	In order to make the soldiers courageous in overcoming the enemy, they
must be roused to anger.  In order to capture more booty from the enemy,
soldiers must have their rewards.
	Therefore, in chariot fighting when more than ten chariots are
captured, reward those who take the first.  Replace the enemy's flags and
banners with you own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount them.
Treat the prisoners of war well, and care for them.  This is called "winning a
battle and becoming stronger."
	Hence, what is valued in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And
the general who understands how to employ troops is the minister of the
people's fate and arbiter of the nation's destiny.


Chapter 3 : Offensive Strategy

	Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it
is inferior to this.  To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to
destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to
destroy them.  For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not
the acme of skill.  To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme
excellence.
	Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's
strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy.  The next best is
to attack his army.  And the worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities
only when there is no alternative because to prepare big shields and wagons and
make ready the necessary arms and equipment require at least three months, and
to pile up earthen ramps against the walls requires an additional three months.
The general, unable to control his impatience, will order his troops to swarm
up the wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed
without taking the city.  Such is the calamity of attacking cities.
	Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle.
They capture the enemy's cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state
without protracted operations.  Their aim is to take all under heaven intact by
strategic considerations.  Thus, their troops are not worn out and their gains
will be complete.  This is the art of offensive strategy.
	Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's
one, surround him.  When five times his strength, attack him.  If double his
strength, divide him.  If equally matched, you may engage him with some good
plan.  If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing.  And if in all
respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for
one more powerful if it fights recklessly.
	Now, the general is the assistant to the sovereign of the state.  If
this assistance is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if
defective, the state will certainly be weak.
	Now, there are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune
upon his army:

	1. When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order an advance;
	or when ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement.
	This is described as "hobbling the army."

	2. When ignorant of military affairs, to interfere in their
	administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed.

	3. When ignorant of command problems, to interfere with the direction
	of the fighting.  This engenders doubts in the minds of the officers.

	If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will take
advantage of this and cause trouble.  This is what is meant by: "A confused
army leads to another's victory."

	Thus, there are five points in which victory may be predicted:

	1. He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be
	victorious.

	2. He who understands how to fight in accordance with the strength of
	antagonistic forces will be victorious.

	3. He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious.

	4. He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is not
	well prepared will be victorious.

	5. He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign
	will be victorious.

	It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known.
	Therefore, I say: Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred
battles, you will never be defeated.  When you are ignorant of the enemy but
know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.  If ignorant both
of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.


Chapter 4 : Dispositions

	The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible
and then awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability.  Invincibility depends on
oneself, but the enemy' vulnerability on himself.  It follows that those
skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be
certainly vulnerable.  Therefore, it can be said that, one may know how to win,
but cannot necessarily do so.
	Defend yourself when you cannot defeat the enemy, and attack the enemy
when you can.  One defends when his strangth is inadequate; he attacks when it
is abundant.  Those who are skilled in defense hide themselves as under the
nine-fold earth; those in attack flash forth as from above the ninefold
heavens.  Thus, they are capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a
complete victory.
	To foresee a victory which the ordinary man can foresee is not the acme
of excellence.  Neither is it if you triumph in battle and are universally
acclaimed "expert," for to lift an autumn down requires no great strength, to
distinguish between the sun and moon is no test of vision, to hear the
thunderclap is no indication of acute hearing.  In ancient times, those called
skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered.  And, therefore, the
victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor
merit for courage.  For he wins his victories without erring.  Without erring
he establishes the certainty of his victory; he conquers an enemy already
defeated.  Therefore, the skillful commander takes up a position in which he
cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to overcome him enemy.  Thus, a
victorious army always seeks battle after his plans indicate that victory is
possible under them, whereas an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of
winning but without any planning.  Those skilled in war cultivate their
policies and strictly adhere to the laws and regulations.  Thus, it is in their
power to control success.
	Now, the elements of the art of war are first, the measurement of
space; second, the estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth,
comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory.  Measurements of space are derived
from the ground.  Quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from
comparisons.  Thus, a victorious army is as one yi balanced against a grain,
and a defeated army is as a grain balanced against one yi.
	It is because of disposition that a victorious general is able to make
his soldiers fight with the effect of pent-up waters which, suddenly released,
plunge into a bottomless abyss.


Chapter 5 : Posture of Army

	Generally, management of a large force is the same as management of a
few men.  It is a matter of organization.  And to direct a large force is the
same as to direct a few men.  This is a matter of formations and signals.  That
the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is
due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces.  Troops thrown
against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a solid acting
upon a void.
	Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage and use the
extraordinary forces to win.  Now, the resources of those skilled in the use of
extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth, as inexhaustible
as the flow of the great rivers, for they end and recommence - cyclical, as are
the movements of the sun and moon.  They die away and are reborn - recurrent,
as are the passing seasons.  The musical notes are the passing seasons.  The
musical notes are only five in number, but their combinations are so infinite
that one cannot visualize them all.  The flavors are only five in number, but
their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all.  In battle, there
are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are
limitless; none can comprehend them all.  For these two forces are mutually
reproductive.  It is like moving in an endless circle.  Who can exhaust the
possibility of their combination?
	When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum;
when the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing.
 Thus, the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack 
precisely timed.  His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, 
that of the release of the trigger.
	In tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there must be no
disorder in one's own troops.  The battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos,
but one's array must be in good order.  That will be proof against defeat.
 Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of 
courage; apparent weakness, of strength.  Order of disorder depends on 
organization and direction; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or 
weakness on tactical dispositions.  Thus, one who is skilled at making the 
enemy move does so by creating a situation, according to which the enemy will 
act.  He entices the enemy with something he is certain to want.  He keeps the 
enemy on the move by holding out bait and then attacks him with picked troops.
	Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and
does not demand it of his subordinates.  He selects suitable men and exploits
the situation.  He who utilizes the situation uses his men in fighting as one
rolls logs or stones.  Now, the nature of logs and stones is that on stable
ground they are static; on a slope, they move.  If square, they stop; if round,
they roll.  Thus, the energy of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be
compared to the momentum of round boulders which roll down from a mountain
thousands of feet in height.


Chapter 6 : Void and Actuality

	Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his
enemy is at ease, and he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight
is weary.  And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of
battle and are not brought there by him.  One able to make the enemy come of
his own accord does so by offering him some advantage.  And one able to stop
him from coming does so by preventing him.  Thus, when the enemy is at ease, be
able to tire him, when well fed, to starve him, when at rest to make him move.
	Appear at places which he is unable to rescue; move swiftly in a
direction where you are least expected.
	That you may march a thousand li without tiring yourself is because you
travel where there is no enemy.  To be certain to take what you attack is to
attack a place the enemy does not or cannot protect.  To be certain to hold
what you defend is to defend a place the enemy dares not or is not able to
attack.  Therefore, against those skilled in attack, the enemy does not know
where to defend, and against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know
where to attack.
	How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no trace.  How
divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible.  Thus, he is master of his enemy's
fate.  His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for his enemy's weak
positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws if he moves swiftly.  When
I wish o give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep
moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve.
 When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself simply be drawing a line on 
the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from 
going where he wishes.
	If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while, at the same
time, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate my forces and his must be
divided.  And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength
to attack a fraction of his.  Therefore, I will be numerically superior.  Then,
if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with
will fall into hopeless straits.  The enemy must not know where I intend to
give battle.  For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must
prepare in a great many places.  And when he prepares in a great many places,
those I have to fight in will be few.  For if he prepares to the front, his
rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile.  If he
strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable, and if his right, there
will be few troops on his left.  And when he sends troops everywhere, he will
be weak everywhere.  Numerical weakness comes from having to guard against
possible attacks; numerical strength from forcing the enemy to make these
preparations against us.
	If one knows where and when a battle will be fought, his troops can
march a thousand li and meet on the field.  But if one knows neither the
battleground nor the day of battle, the left will be unable to aid the right
and the right will be unable to aid the left, and the van will be unable to
support the rear and the rear, the van.  How much more is this so when
separated by several tens of li or, indeed, be even a few!  Although I estimate
the troops of Yue as many, of what benefit is this superiority with respect to
the outcome of war?  Thus, I say that victory can be achieved.  For even if the
enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging.
	Therefore, analyze the enemy's plans so that you will know his
shortcomings as strong points.  Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern
of his movement.  Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his
position.  Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is
abundant and where deficient.  The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to
conceal them without ascertainable shape.  Then the most penetrating spies
cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you.  It is according to the
situations that plans are laid for victory, but the multitude does not
comprehend this.  Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none
understands how the victory is achieved.  Therefore, when a victory is won,
one's tactics are not repeated.  One should always respond to circumstances in
an infinite variety of ways.
	Now, an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids
the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and
strike weakness.  And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground,
so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy.
 And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant
conditions.  Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in
accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.  Of the five
elements [water, fire, metal, wood, and earth], none is always predominant; of
the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some
short, and the moon waxes and wanes.  That is also the law of employing troops.


Chapter 7 : Manuevering

	Normally, in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
 During the process from assembling his troops and mobilizing the people to 
blending the army into a harmonious entity and encamping it, nothing is more 
difficult than the art of maneuvering for advantageous positions.  What is 
difficult about it is to make the devious route the most direct routeand 
divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait.  So doing, you may set out after 
he does and arrive at the battlefield before him.  One able to do this shows 
the knowledge of the artifice of diversion.
	Therefore, both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuvering for an
advantageous position.  One who sets the entire army in moriton with
impediments to pursue an advantageous position will not attain it.  If he
abandons the camp and all the impediments to contend for advantage, the stores
will be lost.  Thus, if one orders his men to make forced marches without
armor, stopping neithe day nor night, covering double the usual distance at a
stretch, and doing a hundred li to wrest an advantage, it is probable that the
commanders will be captured.  The stronger men will arrive first and the feeble
ones will struggle along behind; so, if this method is used, only one-tenth of
the army will reach its destination.  In a forced march of fifty li, the
commander of the van will probably fall, but half the army will arrive.  Ina
forced march of thirty li, just two-thirds will arrive.  It follows that an
army which lacks heavy equipment, fodder, food, and stores will be lost.
	One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not
enter into aliances with them.  Those who do not know the conditions of
mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct
the march of an army.  Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain
the advantages of the ground.  Now, war is based on deception.  Move when it is
advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration
of forces,.  When campainging, be swift as the wind; in leisurely marching,
majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, be fierce as fire; in
standing, firm as the mountains.  When hiding, be as unfathomable as things
behind the clouds; when moving, fall like a thunderbolt.  When you plunder the
countryside, divide your forces.  When you conquer territory, defend strategic
points.  Weigh the situation before you move.  He who knows the artifice of
diversion will be victorious.  Such is the art of manuevering.


[ FTP site note : the chapters of this file were typed in and posted to the
  CMU andrew.games.xtrek bboard by Kevin Bernatz (kb32@andrew.cmu.edu).  His
  fingers deserve our undying gratitude.  JCH ]