Date: 4 Sep 1997 06:02:07 -0400
From: Charmaine Ferreira - Apocalypse Project 
Subject: IUFO: Bioware article in JAMA


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Date:          Wed, 03 Sep 1997 23:45:39 +0900
To:            deva777@dedot.com
From:          Wes Thomas 
Subject:       Re: Bioware article in JAMA

Char: It was the Aug. 6 issue of JAMA. The issue was dedicated to biowar. See
http://www.ama-assn.org/ for info on ordering it. - Wes

Here are the three posts summarizing that issue: 

>From owner-biowar-l@sub.sonic.net  Thu Sep  4 06:02:06 1997
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 1997 21:16:53 +0900
To: biowar-l@mail.sonic.net
From: Wes Thomas 
Subject: [BIOWAR] IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STILL A THREAT
Sender: owner-biowar-l@sub.sonic.net
Reply-To: Wes Thomas 

AMA Science News Update for the week of August 6, 1997

http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/sci-news/1997/snr0806.htm#jsc7087

IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STILL A THREAT
United Nations urged to stand firm on monitoring and enforcement to limit
weapons development

CHICAGO_Despite Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the threat of
biological warfare by Iraq still exists, according to
an article in the August 6 issue of The Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA), a theme issue on biological
warfare. 

Raymond A. Zilinskas, Ph.D., of the Center for Public Issues in
Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology
Institute, College Park, was also a member of the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) investigative team.
UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency have investigated Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs
since of April of 1991. 

Zilinskas warns that Iraq's biological warfare program could be quickly
resurrected: "The workforce of more than 200
persons who staffed Iraq's biological warfare program is intact. Iraq's
civilian biotechnological infrastructure, comprising
more than 80 research, development and production facilities, is whole and
well-equipped ... It is prudent to assume that
the Iraqis retain hidden stores of freeze-dried organisms from its former
biological warfare program." 

He goes on to write: "Because Iraq maintains these human, biological and
industrial resources, it could reconstitute a
biological warfare program rapidly and be able to manufacture militarily
significant quantities of biological warfare agents
within six months." 

Biological weapons are made up of four major components: 

    Payload: the biological agent 
    Munition: a container that keeps the payload intact and virulent during
delivery 
    Delivery system: a missile, artillery shell or aircraft 
    Dispersal mechanism: an explosive force or spray device to disperse the
agent to the target population

Zilinskas says Iraq's biological warfare program began in earnest in 1985.
By the time the Persian Gulf War ended with a
cease-fire in April of 1991, Iraq's scientists had investigated the
biological warfare potential of five bacterial strains
(including anthrax), five viruses, four toxins (including botulinum, the
most toxic chemical known to science), and one
fungal strain which could be used against crops. 

In 1990, Iraq produced 200 biological bombs_including 100 filled with
botulinum and 50 with anthrax. The biologically
armed bombs were deployed at two sites, ready for use. 

Iraq's biological warfare arsenal was not used during the Gulf War. If it
had been, Zilinskas says the arsenal probably
would have been militarily ineffective_ because it was small, the payload
dispersal mechanisms were ineffective, and
because the coalition forces had overwhelming air superiority and had
crippled Iraq's command and communications
network. 

After the April 1991 cease-fire, Iraq's biological warfare program
personnel were reportedly ordered to destroy all
biological warfare agents. But UNSCOM has been unable to independently
verify that the destruction took place.
UNSCOM also cannot certify that all biological bombs have been destroyed. 

Iraq today is similar to Iraq before the Gulf War, according to Zilinskas.
It has the same leader, Saddam Hussein. It has a
large and powerful army and air force, and it can deploy a large,
well-trained civilian workforce. It has the world's third
largest oil reserves. Politically, it has the same uneasy, distrustful
relations with its neighbors that it had before the war. 

Zilinskas suggests: "In consideration of this unsettled situation, it is
wise to prepare for the possibility of Iraq's trying once
again to gain a dominant position in the Middle East." 

He says UNSCOM must continue to monitor Iraq's biological research,
development, production and testing facilities to
guarantee that they are not used once again for biological warfare
applications: "As long as UNSCOM is able to continue
fulfilling its monitoring responsibilities, Iraq's leadership is likely to
be deterred from biological warfare acquisition." 

He concludes: "Clearly, UNSCOM must remain fully operational until such
time as a leadership is established in Iraq which
poses no threat to its neighbors."
(JAMA. 1997;278:418-424) 

Go back to the top. 


PREPARATIONS AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SHOULD BE HIGHER PRIORITY
Greater cooperation needed between military and agencies that protect
civilian population

CHICAGO_The U.S. continues to take steps to prepare against a biological
attack, but the matter requires greater
emphasis, according to a commentary in the August 6 issue of The Journal of
the American Medical Association (JAMA),
a theme issue on biological warfare. 

Richard Danzig, J.D., D.Phil., and Pamela B. Berkowsky, M.A.L.D., both
formerly of the Office of the Undersecretary of
the Navy, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., write on why the U.S.
should be concerned about biological
warfare. Richard Danzig is now a Washington, D.C. lawyer. Pamela Berkowsky
is with the Office of the U.S. Secretary
of Defense. 

The authors write that biological warfare is possible because small groups
of people with modest finances and basic
training in biology and engineering can develop an effective biological
weapons capability. Recipes for making biological
weapons are even available on the Internet. "Most disturbingly, they can be
used to threaten civilian populations and create
mass panic. Used this way, biological weapons can achieve military goals by
undercutting the civilian support necessary for
military operations or by holding civilians hostage to prevent military
operations." 

The authors contend there are three reasons why biological weapons have
been low on the U.S. agenda: 

    Defense against a biological attack is both unfamiliar and difficult,
leading to a natural tendency to put it aside in
    favor of problems that are more comfortable. 
    There is the belief that because biological weapons have never been
used they therefore never will be. 
    There is a sense that a regime can be deterred from using biological
weaponry if we make it clear that this would
    invite nuclear retaliation.

The authors say these modes of thought are "dangerously inappropriate." 

They add that the Department of Defense has embarked on a challenging
program to enhance its capabilities to defend
against biological warfare. The program includes the development and
fielding of state-of-the-art biodetectors; the creation
and designation of selected military units with expertise in medical
prophylaxis, hazard mitigation, and decontamination;
investments in vaccine and antibiotic research, development, and
stockpiling; refinement and acquisition of masks and
improvements in air filtration systems and the development of doctrine
regarding how to preempt and, when necessary,
respond to a biological attack. 

This summer, more than 100 cities in the U.S. are training their fire,
police, rescue, and hospital emergency department
personnel under an ambitious program conducted by the Department of Defense. 

They conclude: "From another vantage point, the good news wrapped inside
the particular problems posed by biological
weapons is that in this arena, public health is the best form of civil
defense. Our everyday domestic investments to detect
and diagnose disease can and should be strengthened because of our national
security trends. Biological weapons are not
respectful of traditional boundaries of geography, bureaucracy, or
conceptual compartmentalization. In that fact lies our
challenge, our opportunity, and our call to action."
(JAMA. 1997;278:431-432) 

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>From owner-biowar-l@sub.sonic.net  Thu Sep  4 06:02:06 1997
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Date: Wed, 06 Aug 1997 07:04:40 -0400
From: Dan 
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To: biowar-l@mail.sonic.net
Subject: [BIOWAR] DOD gearing up for Biowar
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Reply-To: Dan 

>From http://www.pathfinder.com/
@@ZayUeQcAMfQU@yLW/living/latest/RB/1997Aug05/676.html

Biological Weapons A Threat

By Theresa Tamkins

NEW YORK (Reuters) -- Biological weapons are relatively easy to make,
easy to hide and can be dispersed with something as simple as a
purse-sized perfume atomizer. And
Iraq still has all of the elements in place that made biological warfare
a real threat during the Persian Gulf War, according to two reports in a
special issue of The Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA).

Both reports seem to be on the mark, said Andrew Krepinevich, executive
director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a
nonpartisan, nonprofit
Washington, D.C.-based think tank that examines issues pertaining to
U.S. defense strategy and defense budgets.

``Biological weapons have a great potential to be the poor man's nuclear
weapon,'' Krepinevich said. The U.S. now spends $3 billion to $4 billion
a year on efforts to protect the country from missile attack. However,
``these sorts of biological attacks, I think, are much more likely to be
at the forefront of what I would term 'nontraditional' attack on the
American homeland,'' he said.

To prepare for such an attack, the Department of Defense is launching a
program to develop better detectors, train special military units, and
invest in vaccine and antibiotic research as well as to acquire masks
and filtration systems to protect against bacteria, viruses, or toxins
used as weapons. And the federal government is moving to better equip
state and local authorities in case of such an emergency, which is all
part of
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.

``More than 100 cities in the United States have already been designated
under the provisions of this legislation,'' reported Richard Danzig and
Pamela Berkowsky in JAMA. ``Their fire, police, rescue, and hospital
emergency department personnel will receive training and equipment in an
ambitious program conducted by the Department of
Defense that began this summer,'' wrote the two former employees of the
Office of the Undersecretary of the Navy in Washington, D.C. Currently,
Danzig is practicing law in
Washington and Berkowsky is a special assistant in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

Biological weapons are a real threat, according to the commentary in the
journal.

``Since aerosolization is the predominant method of dissemination,
extraordinarily low-technology methods, including agricultural crop
dusters, back-pack sprayers, and
even purse-size perfume atomizers will suffice,'' wrote Danzig and
Berkowsky. ``Small groups of people with modest finances and basic
training in biology and engineering can
develop an effective biological weapons capability. Recipes for making
biological weapons are even available on the Internet.''

Also in the journal, Dr. Raymond Zilinskas at the Center for Public
Issues in Biotechnology at the University of Maryland in College Park
reports that Iraq's biological warfare program could be resurrected.
There are 80 research and
development facilities and 200 personnel still in Iraq that were
involved in the original biological weapons research.

``It is prudent to assume that the Iraqis retain hidden stores of
freeze-dried organisms from its former biological warfare program,''
writes Zilinskas, who was a member of the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) investigative team. ''Because Iraq maintains these
human, biological and industrial resources, it could reconstitute a
biological warfare program rapidly and be able to manufacture militarily
significant quantities of biological warfare agents within six months.''

U.N. resolutions ``designed to ensure a subdued Iraq'' are the barriers
to that country starting biological warfare programs up again, says
Zilinskas. ``The U.N. Commission's
actions to closely and continuously monitor Iraq's biological research,
development, production, and testing facilities is the best guarantee
that these facilities are unable to take up such work.''

SOURCE: The Journal of the American Medical Association
(1997;278:418-424, 431-432)

Reut18:44 08-05-97

(05 Aug 1997 18:46 EDT)

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>From owner-biowar-l@sub.sonic.net  Thu Sep  4 06:02:06 1997
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Date: Wed, 06 Aug 1997 21:15:03 +0900
To: biowar-l@mail.sonic.net
From: Wes Thomas 
Subject: [BIOWAR] Food contamination
Sender: owner-biowar-l@sub.sonic.net
Reply-To: Wes Thomas 

AMA Science News Update for the week of August 6, 1997

http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/sci-news/1997/snr0806.htm#jsc7087

INTENTIONAL FOOD CONTAMINATION STILL CAUSE FOR CONCERN
Criminal aspect should not be overlooked

CHICAGO_Investigators of outbreaks of foodborne illness that do not fit
usual patterns should consider the possibility of
contamination, according to two articles in the August 6 issue of The
Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA). 

The articles examine two rarely seen cases of intentional food
contamination in the United States: one involved a large
community outbreak of Salmonella in The Dalles, Ore., in 1984; the other,
which is still under investigation, involved
Shigella dysenteriea among 12 laboratory workers at a large medical center
in Texas in 1996. 

"This intentional outbreak of Salmonella gastroenteritis may have occurred
13 years ago, but coupled with the report ... of
an intended infection of Shigella among hospital laboratory workers last
year, the outbreak in The Dalles, Ore., represents
a timely cause for concern," writes Annette Flanagin, R.N., M.A., Associate
Senior Editor for JAMA. Flanagin and Nobel
Laureate microbiologist Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D., of Rockefeller University,
New York, N.Y., are co-editors of this
week's issue of JAMA, a theme issue on the use of biological agents as
weapons. In an editorial, Dr. Lederberg states that
although the intentional attacks reported in JAMA were relatively "small
scale ... amateurish in design and ending with
limited malefaction ...[they] touch on a set of timeliest concerns that
unite national security and public health." 

Salmonella at the Salad Bar

In the first article, Thomas J. Torok, M.D., from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Ga.,
and colleagues examined the 1984 intentional Salmonella Typhimurium
contamination of 751 persons who ate or worked
at salad bars in 10 restaurants targeted by religious followers of Bhagwan
Shree Rajneesh in The Dalles. It was not until
more than a year after the outbreak that sufficient evidence had
accumulated to link the religious commune with the
outbreak. 

Salmonella is characterized by rapid symptom onset including stomach pain,
vomiting and diarrhea. 

The authors write: "It is hoped that wider dissemination today of the
epidemiologic findings from The Dalles outbreak will
lead to greater awareness of the possibility of other incidents and earlier
recognition, when or if a similar incident occurs.
This potential benefit should outweigh the risk of a copycat incident. It
may be that with a higher index of suspicion in The
Dalles, the source of S. Typhimurium would have been identified sooner." 

They continue: "The public is best protected when health care professionals
and laboratories cooperate with local and state
health departments to report notifiable diseases and unusual disease
clusters ... On the basis of our experience in The
Dalles, we also suggest that if investigation of a large and cryptic
outbreak implicates a mechanism of contamination that
does not reflect established patterns, then the possibility of intentional
contamination should be considered and law
enforcement agencies should be ask to consider undertaking an independent
investigation." 

Outbreaks of foodborne infection are caused by foods that are intrinsically
contaminated or that become contaminated
during harvest, processing or preparation. It is generally assumed that
such contamination events occur inadvertently.
Intentional contamination with a biological agent is rarely suspected or
reported, according to information cited in the
report.
(JAMA.278;1997:389-395) 

Pastries Contamination with Shigella dysenteriae

In a second article in the August 6 issue of JAMA, Shellie A. Kolavic,
D.M.D., M.P.H., from the CDC and the Texas
Department of Health, Austin, Texas, and colleagues studied case reports of
12 laboratory workers who suffered
suspected intentional infection with Shigella dysenteriae type 2 after
eating contaminated pastries anonymously left in a
break room in a large medical center in Texas in 1996. Shigella dysenteriae
can cause severe, acute diarrheal illness. 

The source of this outbreak was most likely from the laboratory's storage
freezer. Contamination method and motive are
still unestablished. The authors hypothesize that the act was done by
someone who knew how to culture organisms and
had access to both the freezer and the locked breakroom. A criminal
investigation is ongoing. 

Reports of bioterrorism through food contamination appear about once each
decade, according to the authors. 

The researchers write: "The results of this investigation underscore the
biological threat that accompanies malicious use of
pathogenic microbiologic agents. Although no system can provide absolute
security, measures to reduce risk of such
occurrences might include controls similar to those implemented by the
medical center described in this article. These
include controlled access to laboratory areas where the materials are
stored, locked freezers that can only be opened by
designated personnel and maintenance of a written record of persons
entering these areas and handling these materials.
Guidelines should be established for secure storage and close surveillance
of laboratory stock cultures."
(JAMA.278;1997:396-399) 

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