From: Jack Andrews 
Subject: IUFO: Absurdity of Plant Pain
Date: 24 Jul 2000 04:44:38 -0400
To: iufo@topica.com

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HOW MIGHT CHARLES DARWIN RESPOND?

With respect to this extravagant debate on plant pain we have at hand a 
most promiscuous adjoining of some verified
facts with improper inferences. This reminds me of a story (probably 
apocryphal as are so many of the best anecdotes)
about Charles Darwin who in his later years was the guest of a family 
whose two boys approached him with a clever
deception. Using some old desiccated specimens of insects, they had 
deftly attached the wings of a butterfly, the head of
a beetle and the legs of a grasshopper to the body of a centipede. "We 
have this strange bug we caught some time ago"
they innocently said, "Can you tell us what it might be?" Darwin 
squinted and examined it as best he could and asked,
"Can you remember if it hummed when you caught it?" he asked in all 
seriousness. Without smirking, the boys
answered yes, whereupon Darwin replied, "Just as I thought, it is a 
humbug!"

THE SPECIOUS INFERENCE OF PLANT PAIN

No doubt we all have been amazed by much "humbug" on this conference, 
but maybe no greater example is to be given
than that of "plant pain". Those whose common sense remains intact will 
have no difficulty in accepting as sufficient
the following:

  1.Our best science to date shows that plants lack any semblance of a 
central nervous system or any other system
    design for such complex capacities as that of a conscious suffering 
from felt pain. 
  2.Plants simply have no evolutionary need to feel pain. Animals being 
mobile would benefit from the ability to sense
    pain; plants would not. Nature does not create gratuitously such 
complex capacities as that of feeling pain unless
    there should be some benefit for the organism's survival. 

Well, as Oliver Goldsmith realistically observed, "Every absurdity has 
its champions to defend it". And yes, we have
some defenders who would ignore common sense and argue for plant pain. 
Remarkable!. But maybe not so remarkable
if we keep in mind the motivation for such humbug. The following 
argument has repeated been voiced against the
concern of us who would forward greater regard for the woefully 
neglected and grievous suffering of those sentient
creatures who cannot defend, nor articulate in words, their plight. The 
following `reductio ad absurdum' is supposed to
suffice as an irrefutable trashing of animal rights.

Premise(1): If a sentient being can consciously experience pain and 
suffering, then it is wrong to inflict pain &
suffering on such a sentient being.

Premise(2): Plants are sentient beings that can experience pain & 
suffering.

Conclusion: It is wrong to inflict pain & suffering on plants.

In order to challenge the acceptability of premise(1), the anti- AR 
would have us believe that such a premise ineluctably
leads to the absurd conclusion as stated above. In order to achieve this 
coup de grace of animal rights, the anti-AR who
would give little or no coin to premise (1), would instead introduce the 
claims of premise(2) as somehow
"scientifically established". In order to debunk animal rights as 
foolish, the anti-AR would first have us believe in the
reality of "plant pain". Hence, they would attempt to bury AR into a 
hole but ironically by first bulldozing a much
deeper one for themselves.

"EVERY ABSURDITY HAS ITS CHAMPIONS TO DEFEND IT"

You say that I am merely spinning my wheels on a straw man? Then permit 
me to quote from two of the most
loquacious and articulate promoters of plant "pain" on this conference.

Someone like Rich Young would bait us with the following argument, an 
argument that presumably he still holds as
having merit by virtue of his repeated postings of this worn polemic:

AR: "You're crude and unfeeling; you'd probably laugh at your mother's 
death."
non-AR: "That's silly, my mother is a human. A deer isn't."
AR: "Deer can suffer, and so do cattle...so I don't eat meat."
non-AR: "You apparently have no problem killing plants, though."
AR: "It's not the same. Plants aren't animals."
non-AR: "You're killing a living thing for food, nevertheless."
AR: "But it can't feel; it's not sentient; it has no nervous system."
non-AR: "Does dissimilarity rule out 'pain'?"
AR: "Yes."
non-AR: "That's completely illogical and unscientific."

Note how Rich would invoke the authority of logic and science as 
"completely" on his side. Next, consider the
assertions of Toby Bradshaw:

    As a plant molecular biologist with quite a few refereed papers on 
the subject of cellular communication in
    plants, please allow me to debunk the unsubstantiated mythology 
described above. Plants have no *need* to
    feel pain? Ridiculous.

    When a plant is attacked by an herbivorous insect, might it not be 
in the best interest of the plant to mobilize
    its chemical defenses in other parts of the plant in anticipation of 
further insect attack? When a leaf is infected
    by a pathogenic fungus, might the rest of the plant wish to bolster 
its chemical and enzymatic defenses against
    the spread of the pathogen? News flash -- the plant *would* benefit, 
hence the development of a systemic
    (throughout the plant) response to local tissue damage by herbivores 
and pathogens. (Many) references
    available upon request. It might easily be argued that *because* 
plants can't move they need effective
    chemical defenses and effective detection and communication. This is 
the case. You may doubt the sensory
    and integrative abilities of plants, so I invite you to spend a few 
weeks in my lab and learn the truth. Plants
    don't have nerves, since they don't share a particularly recent 
common ancestor with animals. Plants feel tissue
    injury and respond quickly, precisely, and with an effective battery 
of defenses. They don't feel *like us*, but it
    would be a mistake to say that they *don't feel*. 

Here we have the authority of logic, science and "truth" being 
imprecated against the sorry state of AR nescience and
"mythology". Yet, no single published book, or paper in a scientific 
journal, has been cited as indeed making this claim
that "plants feel pain". Sure, there is interesting evidence about 
plants reacting to local tissue damage and even sending
signalling molecules serving to stimulate certain chemical defenses of 
nearby plants. But what has this got to do with
supporting the only morally relevant claim worth considering, namely 
that "plants FEEL AND SUFFER from pain"?
Where are the scientific references for this putative fact?

Now, dear reader, please be patient with my indulgence to develop a 
reasoned reply to such assertive and authoritative
pronouncements about plant pain.

A REDUCTIO ON A REDUCTIO

Although the plant pain promoters are fond of reductios, they will not 
likely appreciate the following extension of their
own. By their "logic", it would equally be the case that rain clouds 
behave purposefully in the sense that they could be
said to functionally remove, by way of raining, excessive moisture that 
is causing their overstaturation.

Furthermore, rain clouds bear meaningful information about their level 
of oversaturation in the form of weight relative
to volume. Do not clouds, therefore, "sense" (in some tortured notion of 
the word) when atmospheric pressure is
insufficient for their moisture content to remain in a vaporous state?

The promoters of plant pain would have us believe, against our good 
common sense, that by the mere presence of
purposive BEHAVIOURS of avoidance and REACTIONS to tissue damage in 
plants we therefore must attribute to
plants mental states like that of some kind of "felt pain".

Well, then by the same logic we must do the same to clouds. In the hole 
that these promoters of plant pain would dig
for themselves, not only must we accept the thesis of plant pain, we 
would also have to swallow some notion of "cloud
sentience"!

THE BEHAVIOURAL INFERENCE OF MENTAL STATES

Lest we forget the ultimate point of what follows, let us not forget the 
central thesis of AR. Simply stated: to the extent
other animals share with us, at least to some degree, certain morally 
relevant attributes, then to that extent we cannot
ignore, for the purposes of consistency or justice, giving due regard 
and concern towards those animals. Two attributes
that are arguably relevant are:

  1.our commonly shared interest in the avoidance of pain and suffering. 

  2.and the quality of other animals also being subjects-of- a-life 
which matters to them as to how such a life fares
    well or ill. 

Both these qualities posit other animals having certain mental states. 
Also note that in order to speak of "mental states"
proper, we would denote, as common usage would dictate, that such states 
are marked by consciousness. It is simply
insufficient to mark off mental states by only the presence of 
purposefulness or intentionality since many objects, like
thermostats and hand calculators, possess purposeful-looking behaviours 
or are in an information-bearing state.

Let us further observe that the attribution of morally relevant mental 
states to even humans was at one time an issue of
contention. For example, consider the case of that very prestigious 
scientific apologist of his society's ambient
prejudices, Silas Mitchell, founder of American neurology. He claimed 
that civilized men suffered pain in a far more
ethically relevant manner:

    "In our process of being civilized we have won . . .intensified 
capacity to suffer. The savage does not feel pain
    as we do" [1]. 

Today, we can witness a similar prejudice that animals do not suffer 
pain to the same capacity as we do. For instance, a
cow after surgery will right away start eating grass, therefore it will 
be said that the cow cannot be suffering from
post-surgery pain. Just as with the stoic "savage", who is to say that a 
cow is not likewise simply bearing the pain more
"heroically" since, as with the non-civilized human, food is more of an 
imperative than moaning with pain; indeed, what
else can they do?

So then, how do we properly attribute the existence of mental states to 
other animals, or even to ourselves for that
matter, since in the past we have certainly made mistakes on this score? 
As we have seen, the *criterion of outward
functional behaviour* has been faulty with even humans. Yet, our plant 
pain promoters would employ this same
criterion at a different level, turn things on their head and argue that 
because plants react to noxious stimuli, they
therefore feel pain. Now, if the inference of pain from overt behaviours 
has been faulty for attributing pain where we
now know pain most assuredly exists, then it is probably equally faulty 
in attributing pain where pain does not exist. If
reactions or behaviours were sufficient, then we would have to say that 
a mere toy doll crying and wriggling, when
triggered to do so by certain stimuli, was indeed in pain.

Similarly, we cannot infer the presence of felt pain simply by the 
presence of a sub-class of behaviours which are
functional for an organism's amelioration or avoidance of noxious 
stimuli. Thermostats obviously react to thermal
changes in the environment and respond in a functionally appropriate 
manner to restore an initial "preferred" state
thereby maintaining an equilibrium of the status quo. We would be dirt 
foolish, however, to then attribute to
thermostats that therefore they must "sense" or "feel" some kind of 
"pain". Even warning quotes around our terms don't
protect us from such an catachrestic absurdity.

Clearly, the behavioral criterion of even functional avoidance/defense 
reactions, is simply not sufficient nor even
necessary for the proper attribution of pain as a felt mental state. 
This is not to say that it is completely irrelevant for it
can at least index the presence of pain in those creatures we already 
know or have good reason to believe experience and
suffer pain. Behaviour by itself does not index pain in our toy doll or 
thermostat, but behaviour does usefully index the
occurrence of pain and suffering in those animals that we already have 
reason to believe have the capacity to suffer.

THE RELEVANCE OF SPECIALIZED STRUCTURE

To state the obvious, science, including the biological sciences, are 
generally committed to the working assumption of
scientific materialism or physicalism [2]. Now, unless the "new" biology 
has returned to some arcane version of
vitalism or dualism, then we must start with the generally accepted 
scientific assumption that matter is the only existent
or real primordial constituent of the universe.

Let it be said at the outset that scientific materialism as such does 
not preclude the existence of emergent or functional
qualities like that of mind, consciousness, and feeling (or even, dare I 
say it, free will), but all such qualities are
dependant upon the existence of organized matter. If there is no 
hardware, there is nothing for the software to run on. If
there is no intact, living brain, there is simply no mind. Now, just for 
the record it should also be said that even
contemporary versions of dualism or mind-stuff theories will also make 
depended their embodied mental states in this
world on the presence of sufficiently organized matter.

To briefly state the case, what is referred to as non-reductive 
materialism [3] would simply consider cognitive functions
like consciousness and mind as emergent properties of sufficiently 
organized matter. Just as breathing is a function of a
complex system of organs referred to aggregately as the respiratory 
system, so too is consciousness a function of the
immensely complex information-processing capabilities of a central 
nervous system. Now, according to such a
neo-functionalist account of mental states, HOW the matter is organized 
and in with WHAT materials is not necessarily
delimited to the mammalian brain. It is possible in theory, that our 
Alpha Centaurians who evolved from carrots could
equally instantiate some "higher" functions of consciousness. This may 
even be possible with a future computer given a
sufficiently complex and orderly organization of its hardware and clever 
software. While such a computer does not yet
exist, and we don't yet know about those Alpha Centaurians, we DO know 
that certain living organisms on this planet
do possess the requisite complexity of specialized and highly organized 
structure for the emergence of mental states.

In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain, but IF, AND 
ONLY IF there is a requisite complexity of
organized plant tissue which could serve to INSTANTIATE the kinds of 
complex information processing that is
prerequisite to such higher order mental states as that of consciousness 
and felt pain. A mammalian brain is not
necessary but an immensely complex hierarchically organized central 
processor of some form would be.

Now, where is the morphological evidence that such a complexity of 
tissue in plants exist? Single cells or even
aggregates of surrounding tissue is not sufficient for there to be a 
functional state of felt pain any more than even
todays complex integrated circuit chips evince consciousness of any 
kind. A lot is required and plants just don't have it.
This is not to say that they cannot exhibit complex reactions, but we 
are simply OVER- INTERPRETING such
reactions when they are designated as "felt pain".

With respect to all mammals, birds, and reptiles, we know that they 
possess a sufficiently complex neural structure to
enable felt pain plus an evolutionary need for such consciously felt 
states. They possess complex and specialized
organizations of tissue call sense organs, they possess a specialized 
and complex structure for processing information
and for centrally orchestrating appropriate behaviours in accordance 
with mental representations, integrations and
reorganizations of that information. The proper attribution of felt pain 
in these animals is well justified, but it is not for
plants by any stretch of the imagination.

REFERENCES

  1.Cited from M. Pernick's (1985) "A CALCULUS OF SUFFERING: PAIN, 
PROFESSIONALISM AND
    ANESTHESIA IN 19TH C. AMERICA. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Cited in turn in Bernard Rollin's
    (1989), "THE UNHEEDED CRY: ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ANIMAL PAIN AND 
SCIENCE". Oxford:
    Oxford University Press. I would strongly recommend Rollin's book as 
a very well argued and documented
    scholarly work on this important issue. 
  2.Burtt, E. A. (1924). THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE. 
London: Routledge &
    Kegan 
  3.See Flanagan, Owen's THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2n ed). Mass.: The MIT 
Press. Provides for a good review
    of these issues. 



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