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Subject: IUFO: Fwd: [EWAR]  Alaska Air Statement Contradicts Feds
Date: 21 Feb 2000 12:27:03 -0500
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RELEASED AT 2:15P.M. February 14, 2000
STABILIZER CHECK ON ALASKA AIRLINES PLANE FOUND EQUIPMENT WELL WITHIN
REQUIRED WEAR LIMITS

Contrary to misleading reports in the media, the horizontal stabilizer
mechanism of the Alaska Airlines MD-83 involved in the Flight 261
accident was found to be well within wear limit tolerances in a 1997
heavy maintenance check.

A C-5 check was performed on the aircraft (tail number N963AS) on
September 29, 1997 at the Alaska Airlines maintenance facility in
Oakland. The initial examination of the jackscrew and gimbal nut
assembly of the horizontal stabilizer indicated that the endplay of the
jackscrew was .040 inch, within allowable limits prescribed by Boeing,
the plane's manufacturer who sets those limits.

Boeing's instructions for mechanics performing this check state: "Check
that endplay limits are between .003 and .040 inch. Readings in excess
of above are cause for replacement of acme jackscrew and nut."

The instructions also state that the measurements should be repeated
"several times to ensure consistent results."

The assembly was re-examined on September 30, 1997, indicating that the
endplay was .033 -- well within standards. This test was rechecked five
additional times to ensure consistency of results and each time the
results indicated the endplay was well within standards.

Under the maintenance schedule approved by the FAA and recommended by
Boeing, the endplay of the aircraft's jackscrew and gimbal nut assembly
is conducted every other C-check and was scheduled to be reexamined on
this aircraft in June 2000. The tolerances provided by the manufacturer
are designed so that the aircraft can fly safely until its next
scheduled inspection.

The instructions for this check are included in Boeing's maintenance
manual, and their step-by-step instructions for mechanics. Alaska
Airlines used those instructions in its maintenance task card.

This test is one that is routinely signed off on by both a mechanic and
an inspector to provide an extra level of scrutiny.

Since the multiple rechecks of the jackscrew and gimbal nut assembly
found it to be within specifications, no action was necessary under
Boeing's maintenance manual which is approved by the FAA.



RELEASED AT 12:45 P.M. February 14, 2000
FACTS REGARDING OAKLAND MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATIONS

In recent days, a number of questions have been asked regarding the FAA
and U.S. Attorney's Office investigations into maintenance practices in
Oakland, Calif.

The following information is meant to clarify Alaska's position on these
investigations and reiterate that they have not involved the Alaska
Airlines' aircraft involved with Flight 261 on Jan. 31, 2000.

OVERVIEW

The Oakland Maintenance Base is the primary location where Alaska
performs heavy checks on its Boeing MD-80 fleet. Heavy checks on its
Boeing 737 fleet are primarily performed in Seattle. There are two
parallel investigations into maintenance practices at Oakland. One was
conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration and another is
continuing by the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Alaska has fully cooperated with both the FAA and the U.S. Attorney's
Office in their investigations and has provided all maintenance records
either agency has requested during their investigations.
When these investigations began, Alaska asked the FAA specifically if
any of its aircraft should be grounded and was told by the FAA that it
was not necessary.

THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGATIONS

The source of the allegations leveled at the airline is John Liotine, a
lead A&P mechanic (Airframe and Powerplant) for Alaska in Oakland. Mr.
Liotine is currently on administrative leave, receiving full pay and
benefits. He was placed on leave because his presence in the workplace
has been disruptive to operations.
Mr. Liotine served briefly as president of the Aircraft Mechanics
Fraternal Association local in Oakland until he was removed from office
by mechanics. Mr. Liotine was passed over for promotion by two of the
supervisors he has accused, one of whom started work for Alaska on the
same day Mr. Liotine began his employment with the company. Mr.
Liotine's allegations generally focus on a final check known as the Post
Maintenance Final Run Checklist (PMFRC). This check was developed
specifically by Alaska and is above and beyond the manufacturer's
required maintenance program. Mr. Liotine did complain to Alaska that
the PMRFC should be performed later in the heavy check process. Alaska
Airlines was investigating his complaint when the government
investigations began. Contrary to Mr. Liotine's assertions, he did not
report alleged falsification of documents to the company before going to
the FAA.
Mr. Liotine contends that Alaska employs too few mechanics and that they
are under-compensated. Those claims are untrue.

THE FAA INVESTIGATION

Based on Mr. Liotine's allegations, the FAA in Los Angeles has conducted
an administrative investigation and proposed a $44,000 fine, alleging
that Alaska operated two of its aircraft in an "unairworthy" manner.
Alaska learned later from the media that the fine proposed by the FAA
investigator contacted by Mr. Liotine was $8.72 million, but was
overridden by FAA supervisors and ultimately reduced. Alaska has
challenged the proposed fine. The FAA has taken no subsequent action
since hearing Alaska's side of the story.

THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE INVESTIGATION

Based on Mr. Liotine's allegations, the U.S. Attorney's Office in San
Francisco is conducting a grand jury investigation related to the
allegations reviewed by the FAA. Assisting with the investigation are
the FBI and the DOT Office of Inspector General. Two subpoena's have
been issued by the U.S. Attorney's Office to date. The first subpoena
was issued Dec. 22, 1998 requesting records pertaining to three specific
MD-80 aircraft.
The second subpoena was issued Nov. 23, 1999 requesting records
pertaining to eight additional MD-80 aircraft.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

Oakland Lead Mechanic John Liotine alleges that during a C-check in
November 1998 he discovered a throttle split on an aircraft that was
greater than allowed. (A throttle split is the difference between the
position of the throttle knobs for the No. 1 and No. 2 engines. A split
of up to ? knob is permitted by the manufacturer.) Records, however,
indicate that the throttles were checked twice before Mr. Liotine
claimed to find a split and were twice found to be within limits, as
reflected on two separate work cards. Mr. Liotine still insisted the
throttle split was out of tolerance, but was overruled based on the
previous two work cards. Later records confirm that there was no excess
throttle split when the aircraft was released into service. Mr. Liotine
alleges that the Post Maintenance Final Run Checklist (PMFRC) was
falsified during a C-check for an aircraft in October 1998. However,
shortly after the check was performed, the PMFRC work card disappeared.
A replacement card was prepared. Later, the U.S. Attorney's Office
provided Alaska with a copy of the original card, thereby proving that
the original card existed and supporting Alaska's belief that the card
was illegally removed from the hangar by Mr. Liotine. Almost all
information on the replacement card is identical to the original except
for a few minor discrepancies.
John Gustafson, formerly an Alaska mechanic, alleges that several years
ago he was pressured to release an aircraft after it experienced
mechanical problems in Spokane, Wash. Mr. Gustafson waited six months to
make his allegations, which he asserted for the first time in a letter
announcing his departure from the company. An internal investigation
conducted in 1997 at the time of his complaint failed to corroborate his
allegations. Aside from these instances, Alaska has carefully reviewed
the records subpoenaed for the other eight aircraft and has not been
able to ascertain from the U.S. Attorney's office why these records were 
requested.

ALASKA'S SAFETY RECORD

Alaska underwent its last National Aviation Safety Inspection Program
(NASIP) review by the FAA in 1995. The white glove audit reviewed
maintenance, airworthiness, flight operations, security, and hazardous
material handling by the airline. The program has since been replaced
for the 10 major carriers by the Aviation Transportation Oversight
System (ATOS), a program that provides continual assessment of
compliance as well as risk assessment. In the fall of 1998, the
Department of Defense conducted its biennial safety survey of Alaska's
maintenance, engineering, and flight operations divisions and found them
to be performing an "exceptional" job. (Alaska is a contract carrier for
the U.S. military.) Alaska has received high marks from the FAA Aircraft
Certification Office for its level of compliance with the Aircraft
Certification Systems Evaluation Program (ACSEP), which reviews major
repair data. The last two reviews were conducted in 1997 and 1999. In
the February 6 edition of The Los Angeles Times, the newspaper conducted
an independent analysis of FAA enforcement actions against the 10 major
carriers during the past two decades. According to The Times analysis,
Alaska - the 10th largest carrier - had the fewest number of fines for
maintenance violations. The carrier also ranked ninth in the total
amount of fines paid and sixth in the average amount of fine, according
to The Times findings. Alaska has invested heavily in new technology to
make flying even safer over the past two decades, and continues to do so
today. For instance, in 1989, Alaska became the first airline to use
head-up guidance systems during a passenger-carrying flight to improve
safety during takeoffs and landings in fog. The central component of the
system is the head-up display, which superimposes a holographic image of
the approaching runway on a transparent screen positioned between the
pilot and the cockpit windshield. And in 1996, Alaska became the first
airline in the world to integrate the Global Positioning System (GPS)
with the latest in Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGWPS)
technology. Together, these two technologies improve navigation
approaching pinpoint accuracy and allow pilots to be continuously
updated on their location relative to any nearby land mass.

A HIGHLY SKILLED WORKFORCE

Aircraft Maintenance Technicians at Alaska Airlines are represented by
the Aircraft Mechanics' Fraternal Association (AMFA). Despite Mr.
Liotine's allegations that mechanics are not appropriately compensated,
Alaska and AMFA officials signed a collective bargaining agreement in
June 1999 that assures that their wages and benefits are competitive
with those of mechanics at other major U.S. airlines. Although Alaska is
the smallest of the 10 major carriers, its mechanics rank fifth overall
in starting pay. This agreement also assures that Alaska can continue to
afford and retain the highest caliber employees in the industry. Mr.
Liotine also alleges that Alaska has been unable to attract and hire
additional mechanics in recent years. However, the number of mechanics
per aircraft has actually increased. In 1995, Alaska operated 74
aircraft and employed 626 mechanics, or 8.46 mechanics per aircraft.
Today, Alaska operates 88 aircraft and employs 775 mechanics, or 8.81
mechanics per aircraft. Additionally, Mr. Liotine alleges that some
Alaska mechanics are under qualified. The fact is, Alaska mechanics must
hold specific licenses as per the FAA, as well as a requisite level of
experience determined by the airline. For example, an A&P mechanic must
have an A&P license and at least three years of commercial aircraft
experience, while an avionics technician must have an FCC license and
three years commercial aircraft experience.

CONCLUSION

Alaska strongly believes these allegations lack substance and that these
investigations are unwarranted. While it's absolutely true that Alaska
asks all its employees to do their jobs effectively and efficiently, no
amount of time saved is worth compromising safety.

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To: ewar@topica.com
From: ecotoday@aol.com
Subject: [EWAR]  Alaska Air Statement Contradicts Feds
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 09:03:22 -0800
Message-ID: <0.1300005631.769911765-951758591-951152602@topica.com>
Reply-To: ecotoday@aol.com
X-Loop: 1300005631

http://64.14.130.248/E_latest.asp
RELEASED AT 2:15P.M. February 14, 2000
STABILIZER CHECK ON ALASKA AIRLINES PLANE FOUND EQUIPMENT WELL WITHIN
REQUIRED WEAR LIMITS

Contrary to misleading reports in the media, the horizontal stabilizer
mechanism of the Alaska Airlines MD-83 involved in the Flight 261
accident was found to be well within wear limit tolerances in a 1997
heavy maintenance check.

A C-5 check was performed on the aircraft (tail number N963AS) on
September 29, 1997 at the Alaska Airlines maintenance facility in
Oakland. The initial examination of the jackscrew and gimbal nut
assembly of the horizontal stabilizer indicated that the endplay of the
jackscrew was .040 inch, within allowable limits prescribed by Boeing,
the plane's manufacturer who sets those limits.

Boeing's instructions for mechanics performing this check state: "Check
that endplay limits are between .003 and .040 inch. Readings in excess
of above are cause for replacement of acme jackscrew and nut."

The instructions also state that the measurements should be repeated
"several times to ensure consistent results."

The assembly was re-examined on September 30, 1997, indicating that the
endplay was .033 -- well within standards. This test was rechecked five
additional times to ensure consistency of results and each time the
results indicated the endplay was well within standards.

Under the maintenance schedule approved by the FAA and recommended by
Boeing, the endplay of the aircraft's jackscrew and gimbal nut assembly
is conducted every other C-check and was scheduled to be reexamined on
this aircraft in June 2000. The tolerances provided by the manufacturer
are designed so that the aircraft can fly safely until its next
scheduled inspection.

The instructions for this check are included in Boeing's maintenance
manual, and their step-by-step instructions for mechanics. Alaska
Airlines used those instructions in its maintenance task card.

This test is one that is routinely signed off on by both a mechanic and
an inspector to provide an extra level of scrutiny.

Since the multiple rechecks of the jackscrew and gimbal nut assembly
found it to be within specifications, no action was necessary under
Boeing's maintenance manual which is approved by the FAA.



RELEASED AT 12:45 P.M. February 14, 2000
FACTS REGARDING OAKLAND MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATIONS

In recent days, a number of questions have been asked regarding the FAA
and U.S. Attorney's Office investigations into maintenance practices in
Oakland, Calif.

The following information is meant to clarify Alaska's position on these
investigations and reiterate that they have not involved the Alaska
Airlines' aircraft involved with Flight 261 on Jan. 31, 2000.

OVERVIEW

The Oakland Maintenance Base is the primary location where Alaska
performs heavy checks on its Boeing MD-80 fleet. Heavy checks on its
Boeing 737 fleet are primarily performed in Seattle. There are two
parallel investigations into maintenance practices at Oakland. One was
conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration and another is
continuing by the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Alaska has fully cooperated with both the FAA and the U.S. Attorney's
Office in their investigations and has provided all maintenance records
either agency has requested during their investigations.
When these investigations began, Alaska asked the FAA specifically if
any of its aircraft should be grounded and was told by the FAA that it
was not necessary.

THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGATIONS

The source of the allegations leveled at the airline is John Liotine, a
lead A&P mechanic (Airframe and Powerplant) for Alaska in Oakland. Mr.
Liotine is currently on administrative leave, receiving full pay and
benefits. He was placed on leave because his presence in the workplace
has been disruptive to operations.
Mr. Liotine served briefly as president of the Aircraft Mechanics
Fraternal Association local in Oakland until he was removed from office
by mechanics. Mr. Liotine was passed over for promotion by two of the
supervisors he has accused, one of whom started work for Alaska on the
same day Mr. Liotine began his employment with the company. Mr.
Liotine's allegations generally focus on a final check known as the Post
Maintenance Final Run Checklist (PMFRC). This check was developed
specifically by Alaska and is above and beyond the manufacturer's
required maintenance program. Mr. Liotine did complain to Alaska that
the PMRFC should be performed later in the heavy check process. Alaska
Airlines was investigating his complaint when the government
investigations began. Contrary to Mr. Liotine's assertions, he did not
report alleged falsification of documents to the company before going to
the FAA.
Mr. Liotine contends that Alaska employs too few mechanics and that they
are under-compensated. Those claims are untrue.

THE FAA INVESTIGATION

Based on Mr. Liotine's allegations, the FAA in Los Angeles has conducted
an administrative investigation and proposed a $44,000 fine, alleging
that Alaska operated two of its aircraft in an "unairworthy" manner.
Alaska learned later from the media that the fine proposed by the FAA
investigator contacted by Mr. Liotine was $8.72 million, but was
overridden by FAA supervisors and ultimately reduced. Alaska has
challenged the proposed fine. The FAA has taken no subsequent action
since hearing Alaska's side of the story.

THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE INVESTIGATION

Based on Mr. Liotine's allegations, the U.S. Attorney's Office in San
Francisco is conducting a grand jury investigation related to the
allegations reviewed by the FAA. Assisting with the investigation are
the FBI and the DOT Office of Inspector General. Two subpoena's have
been issued by the U.S. Attorney's Office to date. The first subpoena
was issued Dec. 22, 1998 requesting records pertaining to three specific
MD-80 aircraft.
The second subpoena was issued Nov. 23, 1999 requesting records
pertaining to eight additional MD-80 aircraft.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

Oakland Lead Mechanic John Liotine alleges that during a C-check in
November 1998 he discovered a throttle split on an aircraft that was
greater than allowed. (A throttle split is the difference between the
position of the throttle knobs for the No. 1 and No. 2 engines. A split
of up to ? knob is permitted by the manufacturer.) Records, however,
indicate that the throttles were checked twice before Mr. Liotine
claimed to find a split and were twice found to be within limits, as
reflected on two separate work cards. Mr. Liotine still insisted the
throttle split was out of tolerance, but was overruled based on the
previous two work cards. Later records confirm that there was no excess
throttle split when the aircraft was released into service. Mr. Liotine
alleges that the Post Maintenance Final Run Checklist (PMFRC) was
falsified during a C-check for an aircraft in October 1998. However,
shortly after the check was performed, the PMFRC work card disappeared.
A replacement card was prepared. Later, the U.S. Attorney's Office
provided Alaska with a copy of the original card, thereby proving that
the original card existed and supporting Alaska's belief that the card
was illegally removed from the hangar by Mr. Liotine. Almost all
information on the replacement card is identical to the original except
for a few minor discrepancies.
John Gustafson, formerly an Alaska mechanic, alleges that several years
ago he was pressured to release an aircraft after it experienced
mechanical problems in Spokane, Wash. Mr. Gustafson waited six months to
make his allegations, which he asserted for the first time in a letter
announcing his departure from the company. An internal investigation
conducted in 1997 at the time of his complaint failed to corroborate his
allegations. Aside from these instances, Alaska has carefully reviewed
the records subpoenaed for the other eight aircraft and has not been
able to ascertain from the U.S. Attorney's office why these records were 
requested.

ALASKA'S SAFETY RECORD

Alaska underwent its last National Aviation Safety Inspection Program
(NASIP) review by the FAA in 1995. The white glove audit reviewed
maintenance, airworthiness, flight operations, security, and hazardous
material handling by the airline. The program has since been replaced
for the 10 major carriers by the Aviation Transportation Oversight
System (ATOS), a program that provides continual assessment of
compliance as well as risk assessment. In the fall of 1998, the
Department of Defense conducted its biennial safety survey of Alaska's
maintenance, engineering, and flight operations divisions and found them
to be performing an "exceptional" job. (Alaska is a contract carrier for
the U.S. military.) Alaska has received high marks from the FAA Aircraft
Certification Office for its level of compliance with the Aircraft
Certification Systems Evaluation Program (ACSEP), which reviews major
repair data. The last two reviews were conducted in 1997 and 1999. In
the February 6 edition of The Los Angeles Times, the newspaper conducted
an independent analysis of FAA enforcement actions against the 10 major
carriers during the past two decades. According to The Times analysis,
Alaska - the 10th largest carrier - had the fewest number of fines for
maintenance violations. The carrier also ranked ninth in the total
amount of fines paid and sixth in the average amount of fine, according
to The Times findings. Alaska has invested heavily in new technology to
make flying even safer over the past two decades, and continues to do so
today. For instance, in 1989, Alaska became the first airline to use
head-up guidance systems during a passenger-carrying flight to improve
safety during takeoffs and landings in fog. The central component of the
system is the head-up display, which superimposes a holographic image of
the approaching runway on a transparent screen positioned between the
pilot and the cockpit windshield. And in 1996, Alaska became the first
airline in the world to integrate the Global Positioning System (GPS)
with the latest in Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGWPS)
technology. Together, these two technologies improve navigation
approaching pinpoint accuracy and allow pilots to be continuously
updated on their location relative to any nearby land mass.

A HIGHLY SKILLED WORKFORCE

Aircraft Maintenance Technicians at Alaska Airlines are represented by
the Aircraft Mechanics' Fraternal Association (AMFA). Despite Mr.
Liotine's allegations that mechanics are not appropriately compensated,
Alaska and AMFA officials signed a collective bargaining agreement in
June 1999 that assures that their wages and benefits are competitive
with those of mechanics at other major U.S. airlines. Although Alaska is
the smallest of the 10 major carriers, its mechanics rank fifth overall
in starting pay. This agreement also assures that Alaska can continue to
afford and retain the highest caliber employees in the industry. Mr.
Liotine also alleges that Alaska has been unable to attract and hire
additional mechanics in recent years. However, the number of mechanics
per aircraft has actually increased. In 1995, Alaska operated 74
aircraft and employed 626 mechanics, or 8.46 mechanics per aircraft.
Today, Alaska operates 88 aircraft and employs 775 mechanics, or 8.81
mechanics per aircraft. Additionally, Mr. Liotine alleges that some
Alaska mechanics are under qualified. The fact is, Alaska mechanics must
hold specific licenses as per the FAA, as well as a requisite level of
experience determined by the airline. For example, an A&P mechanic must
have an A&P license and at least three years of commercial aircraft
experience, while an avionics technician must have an FCC license and
three years commercial aircraft experience.

CONCLUSION

Alaska strongly believes these allegations lack substance and that these
investigations are unwarranted. While it's absolutely true that Alaska
asks all its employees to do their jobs effectively and efficiently, no
amount of time saved is worth compromising safety.

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