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Newsgroups: alt.mindcontrol,alt.conspiracy,alt.politics.org.cia
Subject: Nonlethal Weapons and Operations
From: vericomm@linex.com (Mike Coyle)
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 1995 10:58:04 GMT

[nonopapl.zip] = [nonopapl.txt]
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 V E R I C O M M  BBS 510.891.0303 / MindNet
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MindNet Notes:

The views and opinions expressed below are not necessarily the views
and opinions of VERICOMM, MindNet, or the editor, unless otherwise
noted.

Document courtesy of Harlan Girard, International Committee for the
Convention Against Offensive Microwave Weapons, POB 58700, Philadelphia,
PA 19102-8700.

Typesetting by Rick Lawler.

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                                                          95-974 S
                                                September 14, 1995

                     CRS Report for Congress
  ------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Research Service * The Library of Congress

                Nonlethal Weapons and Operations:
        Potential Applications and Practical Limitations

                         John M. Collins
              Senior Specialist in National Defense
                  Office of Senior Specialists

SUMMARY

   Nonlethal weapons and operations (NLW), whether employed for
offensive or defensive purposes, usually supplement rather than
replace lethal instruments.(1)  They are designed to minimize
fatalities among belligerents and non-combatants as well as
unplanned damage to property during wars and so-called operations
other than war.  One important purpose, which accommodates policies
of restraint with overwhelming power, is to expand options,
complicate enemy decision making, and thereby promote greater
freedom of action in the gap between relatively benign pressures
(diplomacy, economic sanctions, military posturing), and deadly
force.  This brief report summarizes technological progress,
potential operations, and practical constraints, then presents a
series of questions that seem to merit better answers before senior
DoD officials and Congress determine which NLW programs to support
and which to defer or discard.(2)

NONLETHAL WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES

   A few nonlethal weapons now are available for use by U.S. Armed
Forces or could be in short notice, but a rich variety of innovated
additions deliverable by manned aircraft, missiles, remotely
piloted vehicles, motor transports, ships, and/or individuals is
under development (see table).

                        NONLETHAL WEAPONS
             Selected by Types and Characteristics

Categories   Typical Types      Primary      Land       Field
                                Targets(1)  Mobile(2)   Testing
                                                        Feasible(3)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological   Biodegrading         I, M      Variable      1-4 yr
             Microbes

Chemical     Irritants (CS;
             Pepper Spray)          P         Yes        Complete

             Calmatives;
             Tranquilizers          P         Yes          1-4 yr
             Adhesives             M,P       Variable      1-4 yr
             ("Stickums")

             Antitraction
             ("Slickums")          M,P       Variable      1-4 yr

             Binding Agents
             (Fibers, Polymers)     I        Variable       1 yr

             Combustion Modifiers  I,M         Yes         1-3 yr

             Metal Embrittle-
             ments/Caustics         M          Yes         > 5 yr

             Odiferous Agents       P          Yes         1-4 yr

             Specialty Foam         P         Variable     < 1 yr

Electro-
magnetic     High-powered
             Microwave             I,M        Variable     1-4 yr

             Nonnuclear Electro-
             magnetic Pulse        M,I        Variable     1-4 yr

             Conductive Ribbons    M,I        Variable    Complete

Directed
Energy       Particle Beams        M,I        Variable     3-5 yr

Thermal      Counter-Sniper
             Counter Mortar        P,I,M         Yes        1-4 yr

             Barriers               P           Yes        1-4 yr

Acoustics    High Intensity
             Sound                  P           Yes        Complete

             Infrasound, Ultra-
             sound (VLF, VHF)       P           Yes         < 1 yr

Electric
Stun         Stun Guns; TASERS      P           Yes  Complete;<1yr


             Water Cannons          P           Yes       Complete

Kinetic      Nonpenetrating
             Projectiles            P           Yes          < 1 yr

Optical      Low Energy Lasers     M,P          Yes          < 1 yr

             Strobe Lights          P           Yes          < 1 yr

             Holographs             P           Yes          1-4 yr
             Directional & Omni-
             directional Flares    M,P          Yes           2 yr

Infor-
mational     Computer Software
             Corruption            M,I       Unnecessary       Now

             Voice Cloning          P        Unnecessary       2 yr

-------------------------------------------------------------------

1.  I = Infrastructure; M = Material; P = Personnel
2.  Land Mobility varies with models.  Weight volume, distance to
    target, and enemy defenses are key considerations.
3.  Feasible test dates may a bit optimistic.  Availability
    commonly depends on complexities and funding.

NOTE: This table was compiled from several sources.  See Note 1,
plus "Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment," _International
Defense Review_, July 1994, p. 33-39; Evancoe, Paul, "Tomorrow's
Weapons of Choice?," _Military Technology_, June 1994, p. 68-71;
"Draft Concept for Non-Lethal Capabilities in Army Operations,"
_Inside the Army_, July 31, 1995, p. 18-19; Kokoski, Richard, "Non-
Lethal Weapons: A Case Study for New Technology Developments,"
_SIPRI Yearbook 1994_, NY, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 373-378;
Major Joseph W. Cook, III, et. al., _Non-Lethal Weapons and Social
Operations_, a Study Conducted for HQ USAF/XOXI in association with
the USAF Institute for National Security Studies at the Air Force
Academy, June 27, 1994, p. 6-13.

   Nonlethal antipersonnel weapons such as malodorous substances,
nonpenetrating projectiles, stun guns, water cannons, and ear-
splitting noises need no explanation.  High-powered microwaves can
melt electronic components; strobe lights may disorient
individuals; holograms may confuse them; aqueous foams can fill
enclosures and form barriers.  Voice cloning makes it possible to
simulate radio broadcasts by enemy officials as a specialized form
of psychological operations.  Embrittlements that break down
molecular bonding in metals, super caustics that attack many
otherwise immune materials, biodegrading bacteria that "eat"
products such as petroleum, and low energy lasers that blind
hostile sensors typify nonlethal weapons that primarily attack
inanimate targets.  Multipurpose implements like "slickums" and
"stickums" could engage personnel and property.  Each type, if and
when perfected, will possess unique strengths and weaknesses
compared with other lethal and nonlethal tools.

POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

   U.S. Armed Forces have as yet put few sophisticated nonlethal
weapons to practical tests.  Marines, for example, deployed with a
small assortment during the February withdrawal of U.N.
peacekeepers from Somalia, but use was limited to a little sticky
foam.  Nearly all NLW, however, hypothetically may be applied under
conditions short of armed combat and to deter, defend against, or
defeat military aggression of any kind, sometimes independently,
but most often as ancillaries to other arms (lethal means might
often constitute essential "insurance policies").

Operations Other Than War

   NLW would be politically attractive during humanitarian
operations and are potentially valuable in other situations short
of war, because they avoid military bloodletting that could
strengthen enemy resolve and precipitate domestic/international
censure.  The U.S. Government might enhance economic sanctions by
conducting nonlethal blockades or clandestinely employing computer
viruses to cripple the offenders' financial system.  Psychological
operations specialists able to "capture" enemy radio and television
frequencies would posses a powerful lever with which to influence
public perceptions and attitudes during crises.

   Peacekeepers might profitably employ acoustic "barricades" to
help keep hotheads apart during crises.  Peace enforcers would
welcome nonlethal weapons to disperse or otherwise control crowds
and deny them access to sensitive areas such as embassies,
arsenals, power plants, and telecommunications centers.  Lasers
that temporarily dazzle, but do not permanently blind, could
discretely disable snipers who use noncombatants as human shields.
Nonlethal weapons also could simplify the evacuation of U.S.
citizens and close associates from unfriendly soil.

   Counterterrorists might apply adhesives, antitraction
substances, and combustion inhibitors to isolate hostage rescue
sites, then tranquilize captors without jeopardizing captives.
Special operations to neutralize enemy nuclear, biological and
chemical warfare facilities could benefit from high-powered
microwaves to suppress enemy defenses; super caustics and metal
embrittlements could disable nuclear reactors, other processors,
and finished weapons; compact particle beams in the hands of
special operations forces could irradiate and neutralize nuclear,
chemical, and biological munitions; aqueous foams could fill
storage rooms thereafter.

Wartime Operations

   Large-scale combat operations offer opportunities to employ
nonlethal weapons independently or as complements of lethal power.
Strategically significant warfare against enemy officials, their
supporters, and infrastructure theoretically is feasible on a grand
scale.  High tech sabotage might insert biodegrading bacteria into
petroleum storage tanks and use high-powered microwaves to disable
fuses in ammunition depots.  Adhesives or superlubricants liberally
applied on seaports, air base runways, highway intersections, steep
railway grades, key bridges, and other bottlenecks could impede
enemy military traffic or bring it to a standstill.  Missiles and
aircraft might deposit conductive ribbons (fine carbon fibers) on
power grids to short-circuit switches and transformers, as they did
during Operation Desert Storm.

   Nonlethal weapons also could be tactically advantageous.
Counterinsurgents, whose main aim is to win hearts and minds, could
minimize collateral damage and noncombatant casualties if armed with
incapacitants. Foes in custody rather than body bags could furnish
valuable intelligence as a bonus.  Various nonlethal implements
could favorably influence urban combat by blocking avenues of
approach and escape, channel enemy formations into ambushes, flush
out strong points while preserving sites of great cultural value,
and simplified reconstruction problems after armed conflict ceases.

PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS

   Practical factors constrain NLW applications.  Weapon
characteristics (size, weight, range, rates of fire,
maintainability), legal limitations, ethics, rules of engagement,
public opinion, arms control, and costs all impose limits.

Technological Limitations

   Whether technologically complex nonlethal weapons will work as
advertised awaits conclusive tests, some of which have not yet been
devised.  U.S. officials remain uncertain concerning the incidence
of inadvertent fatalities (calmatives may render bystanders
comatose; omnidirectional flares may blind friendly forces;
infrasound can cause concussions if the setting is too strong).
Neither is it clear whether all allegedly reversible effects indeed
are.  No one is sure how often U.S. Armed Forces must reapply
"slickums" to particular surfaces or what solvents would best
remove adhesives that stick.  Experiments to ascertain how fast
embrittling agents will weaken metal are permissible, but test on
people are limited to stringent controls.  The likely influence of
tranquilizers on factious crowds thus will remain speculative until
using units accumulate practical experience.

   Some theoretically valuable nonlethal devices may prove
difficult to deliver on targets.  Strategic petroleum reserves
stored in huge, widely separated tanks, some of which hold more
than one million barrels apiece, are not readily accessible to
infiltrators armed with flagons containing biodegrading microbes.
Huge energy requirements frustrate attempts to develop man-portable
EMP and microwave weapons.  Metal embrittlements in many instances
might have to be applied by brush-wielding humans in harm's way.
Battle damage assessments may demand creative techniques (how, for
example, can stun gunners and pulse weapon operators verify whether
human targets that bear no visible scars are incapacitate or
playing possum?).

   Scenarios that envisage a mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons
could overload ground troops unless separate NLW units are formed.
Logistical burdens and costs would increase in any case.
Deployability prospects depend in large part on funds that might
otherwise purchase, operate, and maintain traditional capabilities.

Policy Limitations

   Policy limitations affect the choice of nonlethal weapons as
much as (perhaps more than) technological constraints and costs.
_Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2: Defense Management
Policies and Procedures_ specifies that U.S. weapons and munitions
must undergo legal reviews during development, procurement, and
deployment to ensure compliance with laws of war and moral/ethical
obligations.  No other nations save the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany seem to have similar stipulations.

   The mention of biological and chemical warfare weapons raises
red flags among arms control specialists and on Capitol Hill.  Law
enforcement units may use riot control agents against U.S.
citizens, whereas _Executive Order 11850_ of April 10, 1075 forbids
first use, "in war except in defensive military modes to save lives
such as:...situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen
attacks...or to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists
and paramilitary organizations..."  The benign use of biodegrading
bacteria to clean up oil spills is permissible, but actions to
contaminate enemy petroleum reserves might not be if narrow
interpretations of the Biological Weapons Convention prevail.  Dr.
Matthew Meselson, Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard University,
represents many who believe it would be unwise for nonlethal
weapons to blur the line between use and non use of chemicals by
U.S. Armed Forces, regardless of purposes.  An independent task
force sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations, however,
expressed a different opinion: "It would, of course, be a tragic
irony if nations used lethal means against noncombatants because
nonlethal means were banned by international convention.

   Computer viruses could infect enemy software in "peacetime" and
in war.  Plausible denial might prevent retaliation in kind but, if
that ploy failed, the United States, being an information intensive
society, could well be vulnerable to ruinous counterattacks.  U.S.
policymakers accordingly should proceed cautiously lest they
inadvertently open Pandora's Box.

SUGGESTED INQUIRIES

   Some nonlethal weapon proponents tend to harbor excessive
expectations.  Some opponents tend to reject NLW for emotional
reasons.  Positions that objectively compare nonlethal options with
lethal alternatives probably occupy some as yet undefined middle
ground.  Solutions to unsolved problems consequently should precede
decision to develop, acquire, and deploy particular systems.  The
following questions might prove useful:

   *  Which nonlethal weapons appear most attractive to commanders
      in chief of U.S. combatant commands?

   *  What would be the best mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons in
      DoD's arsenal?

   *  Should special units be formed within each Service to employ
      some or all nonlethal weapons?  What role should U.S. Special
      Operations Command play?

   *  What rules of engagement should determine the choice between
      lethal and nonlethal weapons in emergencies?

   *  Would strong U.S. reliance on nonlethal weapons strengthen or
      weaken deterrence?  How would U.S. allies view this trend?

   *  How would NLW alter strategic and tactical intelligence
      requirements?

   *  Would nonlethal weapons impose unreasonable logistic burdens?

   *  Which biodegrading and chemical non-lethal weapons are
      permissible given arms control conventions to which the
      United States is party?

   *  Should research, development, and acquisition activities as
      well as oversight be centralized under on authority?  If so,
      who?

   *  Could the Department of Justice (DoJ) defray a larger share
      of DoD's nonlethal weapons costs?  Would DoJ be willing?

   *  What size stockpiles of expendable munitions, such as
      adhesives, antitractions, and specialty foams, would be
     required at what costs?

   *  To what extent could costs be confined by modifying lethal
      weapon systems to handle nonlethal munitions as well?

   Hostile nations, non-state adversaries, and criminal
organizations may acquire nonlethal weapons regardless of U.S.
restraint.  Prudent countermeasures consequently seem advisable
whether DoD embraces selected systems or abstains.

1.  Various overviews include Morris, Janet and Chris,
_Nonlethality: A Global Strategy_, Revised Ed., West Hyannisport, MA,
1994, 11 p; Swett, Charles F., _Strategic Assessment: Non-Lethal
Weapons_, Washington, draft report, Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), November
9, 1993, 20 p; Colonel John L. Barry, et al, _Nonlethal Military
Means: New Leverage for a New Era_, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994, 86 p;
_Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications_, NY,
Council of Foreign Relations, 1995, 16 p; Gray, Jan M., _Uses of
Nonlethal Force in Army Operations_, a White Paper (draft), Fort
Monroe, VA, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July 17, 1995,
43 p; _Policy Study: Non-Lethal Technologies_, Washington, JAYCOR,
September 19, 1994, 28 p; Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, "Less-Lethal
Force in Operation United Shield," _Marine Corps Gazette_, September
1995, p. 69-76.

2.  Some definitions of nonlethal weapons exclude parapsychological
operations, deception, electronic warfare, and information warfare.
This document concentrates on new technological developments.

---------------------------------------------------------------
CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress.

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