Objections to the Federal Constitution
      Letter of Robert Yates and John Lansing to the Governor of New York
                             21 December 1787



We beg leave, briefly, to state some cogent reasons, which, among
others, influenced us to decide against a consolidation of the states.  These
are reducible into two heads:--

1st. The limited and well-defined powers under which we acted, and which
could not on any possible construction, embrace an idea of such magnitude as
to assent to a general constitution, in subversion of that of the state.

2nd. A conviction of the impracticability of establishing a general
government, pervading every part of the United States, and extending
essential benefits to all.

Our powers were explicit, and confined to the sole and express purpose
of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting such alterations and
provisions therein, as should render the Federal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union.

From these expressions, we were led to believe that a system of
consolidated government could not, in the remotest degree, have been in
contemplation of the legislature of this state; for that so important a
trust, as the adopting measures which tended to deprive the state government
of its most essential rights of sovereignty, and to place it in a dependent
situation, could not have been confided by implication; and the circumstance,
that the acts of the Convention were to receive a state approbation in the
last resort, forcibly corroborated the opinion that our powers could not
involve the subversion of a Constitution which, being immediately derived
from the people, could only be abolished by their express consent, and not by
a legislature, possessing authority vested in them for its preservation.  Nor
could we suppose that, if it had been the intention of the legislature to
abrogate the existing confederation, they would, in such pointed terms, have
directed the attention of their delegates to the revision and amendment of
it, in total exclusion of every other idea.

Reasoning in this manner, we were of opinion that the leading feature of
every amendment ought to be the preservation of the individual states in
their uncontrolled constitutional rights, and that, in reserving these, a
mode might have been devised of granting to the Confederacy, the moneys
arising from a general system of revenue, the power of regulating commerce
and enforcing the observance of foreign treaties, and other necessary matters
of less moment.

Exclusive of our objections originating from the want of power, we
entertained an opinion that a general government, however guarded by
declarations of rights, or cautionary provisions, must unavoidably, in a
short time, be productive of the destruction of the civil liberty of such
citizens who could be effectually coerced by it, by reason of the extensive
territory of the United States, the dispersed situation of its inhabitants,
and the insuperable difficulty of controlling or counteracting the views of a
set of men (however unconstitutional and oppressive their acts might be)
possessed of all the powers of government, and who, from their remoteness
from their constituents, and necessary permanency of office, could not be
supposed to be uniformly actuated by an attention to their welfare and
happiness; that, however wise and energetic the principles of the general
government might be, the extremities of the United States could not be kept
in due submission and obedience to its laws, at the distance of many hundred
miles from the seat of government; that, if the general legislature was
composed of so numerous a body of men as to represent the interests of all
the inhabitants of the United States, in the usual and true ideas of
representation, the expense of supporting it would become intolerably
burdensome; and that, if a few only were vested with a power of legislation,
the interests of a great majority of the inhabitants of the United States
must necessarily be unknown; or, if known, even in the first stages of the
operations of the new government, unattended to.  These reasons were, in our
opinion, conclusive against any system of consolidated government: to that
recommended by the Convention, we suppose most of them very forcibly apply.

It is not our intention to pursue this subject farther than merely to
explain our conduct in the discharge of the trust which the honorable the
legislature reposed in us.  Interested, however, as we are, in common with
our fellow citizens, in the result, we cannot forbear to declare, that we
have the strongest apprehensions, that a government so organized, as that
recommended by the convention, cannot afford that security to equal and
permanent liberty which we wished to make an invariable object of our
pursuit.

We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; but
before we left the convention, its principles were so well established as to
convince us, that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas
of expediency and safety.  A persuasion, that our further attendance would be
fruitless, and unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return.

We have thus explained our motives for opposing the adoption of the
national constitution, which we conceived it our duty to communicate to your
Excellency, to be submitted to the consideration of the honorable
legislature.

We have the honor to be, With the greatest respect,
Your Excellency's Most obedient, and
Very humble servant,
Robert Yates,
John Lansing, jun.