Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican
                     Written by Richard Henry Lee in 1787.


                                   LETTER V
                               OCTOBER 15th, 1787

DEAR SIR,

Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days
leisure would permit.  It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of seeing
powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators, and many
magistrates, we see all important powers collecting in one center, where a
few men will possess them almost at discretion.  And instead of checks in the
formation of the government, to secure the rights of the people against the
usurpations of those they appoint to govern, we are to understand the equal
division of lands among our people, and the strong arm furnished them by
nature and situation, are to secure them against those usurpations.  If there
are advantages in the equal division of our lands, and the strong and manly
habits of our people, we ought to establish governments calculated to give
duration to them, and not governments which never can work naturally, till
that equality of property, and those free and manly habits shall be
destroyed; these evidently are not the natural basis of the proposed
constitution.  No man of reflection, and skilled in the science of
government, can suppose these will move on harmoniously together for ages, or
even for fifty years.  As to the little circumstances commented upon, by some
writers, with applause--as the age of a representative, of the president,
&c.--they have, in my mind, no weight in the general tendency of the system.

There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in the proposed
system.  It is founded on elective principles, and the deposits of powers in
different hands, is essentially right.  The guards against those evils we
have experienced in some states in legislation are valuable indeed; but the
value of every feature in this system is vastly lessened for the want of that
one important feature in a free government, a representation of the people.
Because we have sometimes abused democracy, I am not among those men who
think a democratic branch a nuisance; which branch shall be sufficiently
numerous to admit some of the best informed men of each order in the
community into the administration of government.

While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so soon
discovered, some temptations to each state, and to many classes of men to
adopt it, are very visible.  It uses the democratic language of several of
the state constitutions, particularly that of Massachusetts; the eastern
states will receive advantages so far as the regulation of trade, by a bare
majority, is committed to it: Connecticut and New Jersey will receive their
share of a general impost: The middle states will receive the advantages
surrounding the seat of government; The southern states will receive
protection, and have their negroes represented in the legislature, and large
back countries will soon have a majority in it.  This system promises a large
field of employment to military gentlemen, and gentlemen of the law; and in
case the government shall be executed without convulsions, it will afford
security to creditors, to the clergy, salary-men and others depending on
money payments.  So far as the system promises justice and reasonable
advantages, in these respects, it ought to be supported by all honest men;
but whenever it promises unequal and improper advantages to any particular
states, or orders of men, it ought to be opposed.

I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there are many
good things in the proposed constitution, and I have endeavored to point out
many important defects in it.  I have admitted that we want a federal
system--that we have a system presented, which, with several alterations may
be made a tolerable good one--I have admitted there is a well founded
uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men.  In this situation of things,
you ask me what I think ought to be done?  My opinion in this case is only
the opinion of an individual, and so far only as it corresponds with the
opinions of the honest and substantial part of the community, is it entitled
to consideration.  Though I am fully satisfied that the state conventions
ought most seriously to direct their exertions to altering and amending the
system proposed before they shall adopt it--yet I have not sufficiently
examined the subject, or formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable
for those conventions to carry their amendments.  As to the idea, that it
will be in vain for those conventions to attempt amendments, it cannot be
admitted; it is impossible to say whether they can or not until the attempt
shall be made; and when it shall be determined, by experience, that the
conventions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an important question
before the people of the United States, whether they will adopt or not the
system proposed in its present form.  This subject of consolidating the
states is new: and because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system, to
suppose the good sense of this country, an enlightened nation, must adopt it
without examination, and though in a state of profound peace, without
endeavoring to amend those parts they perceive are defective, dangerous to
freedom, and destructive of the valuable principles of republican
government--is truly humiliating.  It is true there may be danger in delay;
but there is danger in adopting the system in its present form; and I see the
danger in either case will arise principally from the conduct and views of
two very unprincipled parties in the United States--two fires, between which
the honest and substantial people have long found themselves situated.  One
party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no law, and who
want a share of the property of others; these are called levellers, Shayites,
&c.  The other party is composed of a few, but more dangerous men, with their
servile dependents; these avariciously grasp at all power and property; you
may discover in all the actions of these men, an evident dislike to free and
equal government, and they will go systematically to work to change,
essentially, the forms of government in this country; these are called
aristocrats, m-----ites, &c. &c.  Between these two parties is the weight of
the community; the men of middling property, men not in debt on the one hand,
and men, on the other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at
immense fortunes, offices, and power.  In 1786, the little insurgents, the
levellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to
establish governments according to their wills.  Their movements evidently
gave encouragement to the other party, which, in 1787, has taken the
political field, and with its fashionable dependents, and the tongue and the
pen, is endeavoring to establish in a great haste, a politer kind of
government.  These two parties, which will probably be opposed or united as
it may suit their interests and views, are really insignificant, compared
with the solid, free, and independent part of the community.  It is not my
intention to suggest, that either of these parties, and the real friends of
the proposed constitution, are the same men.  The fact is, these aristocrats
support and hasten the adoption of the proposed constitution, merely because
they think it is a stepping stone to their favorite object.  I think I am
well founded in this idea; I think the general politics of these men support
it, as well as the common observation among them, That the proffered plan is
the best that can be got at present, it will do for a few years, and lead to
something better.  The sensible and judicious part of the community will
carefully weigh all these circumstances; they will view the late convention
as a respectable body of men--America probably never will see an assembly of
men, of a like number, more respectable.  But the members of the convention
met without knowing the sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states
respecting the new ground taken.  Their doings are but the first attempts in
the most important scene ever opened.  Though each individual in the state
conventions will not, probably, be so respectable as each individual in the
federal convention, yet as the state conventions will probably consist of
fifteen hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the science
of government, collected from all parts of the community and from all orders
of men, it must be acknowledged that the weight of respectability will be in
them--In them will be collected the solid sense and the real political
character of the country, Being revisers of the subject, they will possess
peculiar advantages.  To say that these conventions ought not to attempt,
coolly and deliberately, the revision of the system, or that they cannot
amend it, is very foolish or very assuming.  If these conventions, after
examining the system, adopt it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and wish to
see men make the administration of the government an equal blessing to all
orders of men.  I believe the great body of our people to be virtuous and
friendly to good government, to the protection of liberty and property; and
it is the duty of all good men, especially of those who are placed as
sentinels to guard their rights--it is their duty to examine into the
prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose them--while they avoid
exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before the people, which will enable
them to form a proper judgment.  Men who wish the people of this country to
determine for themselves, and deliberately to fit the government to their
situation, must feel some degree of indignation at those attempts to hurry
the adoption of a system, and to shut the door against examination.  The very
attempts create suspicions, that those who make them have secret views, or
see some defects in the system, which, in the hurry of affairs, they expect
will escape the eye of a free people.

What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania, who
precipitated decisions on this subject?  What can be the views of those
gentlemen in Boston, who countenanced the Printers in shutting up the press
against a fair and free investigation of this important system in the usual
way.  The members of the convention have done their duty--why should some of
them fly to their states--almost forget a propriety of behavior, and
precipitate measures for the adoption of a system of their own making?  I
confess candidly, when I consider these circumstances in connection with the
unguarded parts of the system I have mentioned, I feel disposed to proceed
with very great caution, and to pay more attention than usual to the conduct
of particular characters.  If the constitution presented be a good one, it
will stand the test with a well informed people: all are agreed that there
shall be state conventions to examine it; and we must believe it will be
adopted, unless we suppose it is a bad one, or that those conventions will
make false divisions respecting it.  I admit improper measures are taken
against the adoption of the system as well for it--all who object to the plan
proposed ought to point out the defects objected to, and to propose those
amendments with which they can accept it, or to propose some other system of
government, that the public mind may be known, and that we may be brought to
agree in some system of government, to strengthen and execute the present, or
to provide a substitute.  I consider the field of enquiry just opened, and
that we are to look to the state conventions for ultimate decisions on the
subject before us; it is not to be presumed, that they will differ about
small amendments, and lose a system when they shall have made it
substantially good; but touching the essential amendments, it is to be
presumed the several conventions will pursue the most rational measures to
agree in and obtain them; and such defects as they shall discover and not
remove, they will probably notice, keep them in view as the ground work of
future amendments, and in the firm and manly language which every free people
ought to use, will suggest to those who may hereafter administer the
government, that it is their expectation, that the system will be so
organized by legislative acts, and the government so administered, as to
render those defects as I little injurious as possible.  Our countrymen are
entitled to an honest and faithful government; to a government of laws and
not of men; and also to one of their choosing--as a citizen of the country, I
wish to see these objects secured, and licentious, assuming, and overbearing
men restrained; if the constitution or social compact be vague and unguarded,
then we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and moderation of those who
manage the affairs of government; or on what, probably, is equally uncertain
and precarious, the success of the people oppressed by the abuse of
government, in receiving it from the hands of those who abuse it, and placing
it in the hands of those who will use it well.

In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been able, as yet, to
contemplate this subject, I can discern but one rational mode of proceeding
relative to it: and that is to examine it with freedom and candor, to have
state conventions some months hence, which shall examine coolly every
article, clause, and word in the system proposed, and to adopt it with such
amendments as they shall think fit.  How far the state conventions ought to
pursue the mode prescribed by the federal convention of adopting or rejecting
the plan in toto, I leave it to them to determine.  Our examination of the
subject hitherto has been rather of a general nature.  The republican
characters in the several states, who wish to make this plan more adequate to
security of liberty and property, and to the duration of the principles of a
free government, will, no doubt, collect their opinions to certain points,
and accurately define those alterations and amendments they wish; if it shall
be found they essentially disagree in them, the conventions will then be able
to determine whether to adopt the plan as it is, or what will be proper to be
done.

Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper and
unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general government, organized as it at
present is, touching internal taxes, armies and militia, the elections of its
own members, causes between citizens of different states, &c. and the want of
a more perfect bill of rights, &c.  I drop the subject for the present, and
when I shall have leisure to revise and correct my ideas respecting it, and
to collect into points the opinions of those who wish to make the system more
secure and safe, perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your
consideration, the amendments which ought to be ingrafted into this system,
not only in conformity to my own, but the deliberate opinions of others--you
will with me perceive, that the objections to the plan proposed may, by a
more leisure examination be set in a stronger point of view, especially the
important one, that there is no substantial representation of the people
provided for in a government in which the most essential powers, even as to
the internal police of the country, is proposed to be lodged.

I think the honest and substantial part of the community will wish to
see this system altered, permanency and consistency given to the constitution
we shall adopt; and therefore they will be anxious to apportion the powers to
the features and organizations of the government, and to see abuse in the
exercise of power more effectually guarded against.  It is suggested, that
state officers, from interested motives will oppose the constitution
presented--I see no reason for this, their places in general will not be
effected, but new openings to offices and places of profit must evidently be
made by the adoption of the constitution in its present form.

Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.
To the REPUBLICAN.