Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican
                   Written by Richard Henry Lee in 1787.




                                  LETTER II
                               OCTOBER 9, 1787

DEAR SIR,

The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and equal
representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the
vicinage in the administration of justice--a full and equal representation,
is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the
people themselves would were they all assembled--a fair representation,
therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of men in the community,
according to the common course of elections, can have a share in it--in order
to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to
bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the
legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous--We have about
200 state senators in the United States, and a less number than that of
federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full representation of this
people, in the affairs of internal taxation and police, were there but one
legislature for the whole union.  The representation cannot be equal, or the
situation of the people proper for one government only--if the extreme parts
of the society cannot be represented as fully as the central--It is
apparently impracticable that this should be the case in this extensive
country--it would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of
the country five, six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government.

Under one general government alone, there could be but one judiciary,
one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts.  I think it would be
totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due administration of
justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial of the vicinage--there are
now supreme courts in each state in the union, and a great number of county
and other courts subordinate to each supreme court--most of these supreme and
inferior courts are itinerant, and hold their sessions in different parts
every year of their respective states, counties and districts--with all these
moving courts, our citizens, from the vast extent of the country, must travel
very considerable distances from home to find the place where justice is
administered.  I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as to
afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I think it one of
the greatest benefits in a good government, that each citizen should find a
court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within a day's travel
of his home; so that, without great inconveniences and enormous expense, he
may have the advantages of his witnesses and jury--it would be impracticable
to derive these advantages from one judiciary--the one supreme court at most
could only set in the center of the union, and move once a year into the
center of the eastern and southern extremes of it--and, in this case, each
citizen, on an average, would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court--
that, however, inferior courts might be properly placed in the different
counties, and districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be
intolerable and expensive.

If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the features
of a free government, still it is evident that the middle states, the parts
of the union, about the seat of government, would enjoy great advantages,
while the remote states would experience the many inconveniences of remote
provinces.  Wealth, offices, and the benefits of government would collect in
the center: and the extreme states; and their principal towns, become much
less important.

There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of one
consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-founded--the laws of a free
government rest on the confidence of the people, and operate gently--and
never can extend the influence very far--if they are executed on free
principles, about the center, where the benefits of the government induce the
people to support it voluntarily; yet they must be executed on the principles
of fear and force in the extremes--This has been the case with every
extensive republic of which we have any accurate account.

There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed--a free and
enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their rights
to those who govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators and
rulers, which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed, as well as
by those who govern: and the latter will know they cannot be passed
unperceived by the former, and without giving a general alarm--These rights
should be made the basis of every constitution; and if a people be so
situated, or have such different opinions that they cannot agree in
ascertaining and fixing them, it is a very strong argument against their
attempting to form one entire society, to live under one system of laws
only.--I confess, I never thought the people of these states differed
essentially in these respects; they having derived all these rights from one
common source, the British systems; and having in the formation of their
state constitutions, discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are
very similar.  However, it is now said that the states differ so essentially
in these respects, and even in the important article of the trial by jury,
that when assembled in convention, they can agree to no words by which to
establish that trial, or by which to ascertain and establish many other of
these rights, as fundamental articles in the social compact.  If so, we
proceed to consolidate the states on no solid basis whatever.

But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming the
new constitution on a better bill of rights.  I still believe a complete
federal bill of rights to be very practicable.  Nevertheless I acknowledge
the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many new and strong
reasons, against a complete consolidation of the states.  They tend to
convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety very far--that the
convention have gone much farther in one respect than they found it
practicable to go in another; that is, they propose to lodge in the general
government very extensive powers--powers nearly, if not altogether, complete
and unlimited, over the purse and the sword.  But, in its organization, they
furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs, or parts of a government,
to support and execute those powers on proper principles (or in which they
can be safely lodged) cannot be formed.  These powers must be lodged
somewhere in every society; but then they should be lodged where the strength
and guardians of the people are collected.  They can be wielded, or safely
used, in a free country only by an able executive and judiciary, a
respectable senate, and a secure, full, and equal representation of the
people.  I think the principles I have premised or brought into view, are
well founded--I think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner.  It is in
connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to examine the
constitution.  It is not a few democratic phrases, or a few well formed
features, that will prove its merits; or a few small omissions that will
produce its rejection among men of sense; they will enquire what are the
essential powers in a community, and what are nominal ones; where and how the
essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to secure true
liberty.

In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly
perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial
representation of the people.  The state government will exist, with all
their governors, senators, representatives, officers and expenses; in these
will be nineteen twentieths of the representatives of the people; they will
have a near connection, and their members an immediate intercourse with the
people; and the probability is, that the state governments will possess the
confidence of the people, and be considered generally as their immediate
guardians.

The general government will consist of a new species of executive, a
small senate, and a very small house of representatives.  As many citizens
will be more than three hundred miles from the seat of this government as
will be nearer to it, its judges and officers cannot be very numerous,
without making our governments very expensive.  Thus will stand the state and
the general governments, should the constitution be adopted without any
alterations in their organization; but as to powers, the general government
will possess all essential ones, at least on paper, and those of the states a
mere shadow of power.  And therefore, unless the people shall make some great
exertions to restore to the state governments their powers in matters of
internal police; as the powers to lay and collect, exclusively, internal
taxes, to govern the militia, and to hold the decisions of their own judicial
courts upon their own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long;
but the state governments must be annihilated, or continue to exist for no
purpose.

It is however to be observed, that many of the essential powers given
the national government are not exclusively given; and the general government
may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those which may still be
exercised by the respective states.  But this cannot justify the impropriety
of giving powers, the exercise of which prudent men will not attempt, and
imprudent men will, or probably can, exercise only in a manner destructive of
free government.  The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate
to many valuable objects, and be able to carry its laws into execution on
proper principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will not
contend, that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it into
effect, without calling to its aid a military force, which must very soon
destroy all elective governments in the country, produce anarchy, or
establish despotism.  Though we cannot have now a complete idea of what will
be the operations of the proposed system, we may, allowing things to have
their common course, have a very tolerable one.  The powers lodged in the
general government, if exercised by it, must intimately effect the internal
police of the states, as well as external concerns; and there is no reason to
expect the numerous state governments, and their connections, will be very
friendly to the execution of federal laws in those internal affairs, which
hitherto have been under their own immediate management.  There is more
reason to believe, that the general government, far removed from the people,
and none of its members elected oftener than once in two years, will be
forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a
multitude of officers and military force be continually kept in view, and
employed to enforce the execution of the laws, and to make the government
feared and respected.  No position can be truer than this.  That in this
country either neglected laws, or a military execution of them, must lead to
a revolution, and to the destruction of freedom.  Neglected laws must first
lead to anarchy and confusion; and a military execution of laws is only a
shorter way to the same point--despotic government.

Your's, &c.
THE FEDERAL FARMER.