Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican

                   Written by Richard Henry Lee in 1787.


                                  LETTER I
                             OCTOBER 8th, 1787


DEAR SIR,

MY letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced
national government for the United States, were the result of a free enquiry;
when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative to our commerce,
revenues, past administration, &c.  I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on
carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention.  It
appears to be a plan retaining some federal features; but to be the first
important step, and to aim strongly at one consolidated government of the
United States.  It leaves the powers of government, and the representation of
the people, so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments,
that the operations of our system must be very uncertain.  My uniform federal
attachments, and the interest I have in the protection of property, and a
steady execution of the laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias
at all, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those
advantages.  The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and
steady government; but then, I can consent to no government, which, in my
opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of
men in the community.  My object has been to join with those who have
endeavored to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady
and proper administration of them.  Though I have long apprehended that
fraudulent debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand, and men, on the
other, unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among
the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in the
governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests of
particular orders of men.  Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation of
the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it shall be adopted with
a prudent administration.  Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of
Pope's maxim, that "That which is best administered is best," that I am much
inclined to subscribe to it from experience.  I am not disposed to
unreasonably contend about forms.  I know our situation is critical, and it
behooves us to make the best of it.  A federal government of some sort is
necessary.  We have suffered the present to languish; and whether the
confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable
purposes, it is now but of little importance.  I will pass by the men, and
states, who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a
change, and perhaps, for governments not very favorable to the people at
large.  A constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which we may
accept with or without amendments, and to which point we ought to direct our
exertions is the question.  To determine this question with propriety; we
must attentively examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of
either step.  This I shall endeavor to do, so far as I am able, with candor
and fairness; and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the
weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn.  Whatever
may be the conduct of others, on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily
and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed.  I shall
be open to conviction and always disposed to adopt that which, all things
considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the community.
It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of
government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter or abolish
it; and changes must ensue, one after another, till the peaceable and better
part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults and disorders,
and be disposed to accept any government however despotic, that shall promise
stability and firmness.

The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering our
situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution?
If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any
commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of
invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise of their powers;
and our governments answer all present exigencies, except the regulation of
trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing for the interest, in
some instances, of the public debts; and whether we adopt a change three or
nine months hence, can make but little odds with the private circumstances of
individuals; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally
upon their own exertions.  We are hardly recovered from a long and
distressing war: The farmers, fishermen, &c. have not fully repaired the
waste made by it.  Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper
station.  Private debts are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war
have been, by various ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become
a productive source for diminishing them much more.  I know uneasy men, who
with very much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but they are
facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of
this country.  It must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is
defective, and that some of the state governments are not well administered;
but, then, we impute to the defects in our governments many evils and
embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war.  We must
allow men to conduct on the present occasion, as on all similar one's.  They
will urge a thousand pretenses to answer their purposes on both sides.  When
we want a man to change his condition, we describe it as wretched, miserable,
and despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him
assume.  And when we wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions.
Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary
to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably suspecting men of
falsehood, to examine, and enquire attentively, under what impressions they
act.  It is too often the case in political concerns that men state facts not
as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every man, by calling to
mind past scenes, will find this to be true.

Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men, I
conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken fully to
examine and consider the system proposed.  Men who feel easy in their
circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to
the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under the existing
governments.  Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy, not without
just cause, ought to be respected; and by no means, unreasonably disappointed
in their expectations and hopes; but as to those who expect employments under
the new constitution; as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be
gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one
difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded; and as to those
who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be
despised.  It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a
measure, to tell us, now is the crisis--now is the critical moment which must
be seized or all will be lost; and to shut the door against free enquiry,
whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and
investigation will probably discover.  This has been the custom of tyrants,
and their dependents in all ages.  If it is true, what has been so often
said, that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the
worse, I presume it still behooves them to endeavor deliberately to change it
for the better.  The fickle and ardent, in any community are the proper tools
for establishing despotic government.  But it is deliberate and thinking men,
who must establish and secure governments on free principles.  Before they
decide on the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a
blessing or a curse to this people.

The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs.  Our object has
been all along, to reform our federal system and to strengthen our
governments--to establish peace, order and justice in the community--but a
new object now presents.  The plan of government now proposed is evidently
calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people.  Instead of
being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to
make us one consolidated government.  Of this, I think, I shall fully
convince you, in my following letters on this subject.  This consolidation of
the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time
past.  Whether such a change can ever be effected, in any manner; whether it
can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change
will not totally destroy the liberties of this country--time only can
determine.

To have a just idea of the government before us, and to show that a
consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine
the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its particular friends.

The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the
voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states; and the
framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited, and checked the
powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the
union.  We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in the
federal system almost as soon as it was adopted.  It was early proposed to
vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade, &c. but such
was known to be the caution of the states in parting with power, that the
vestment even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and
limitations.  During the war, the general confusion, and the introduction of
paper money, infused in the minds of people vague ideas respecting government
and credit.  We expected too much from the return of peace, and of course we
have been disappointed.  Our governments have been new and unsettled; and
several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws,
have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors.  By these and other causes,
several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a
change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which
in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has
furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means,
with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favorite
object.  And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the
proposed change, prosperity may reproach not only a few overbearing,
unprincipled men, but those parties in the states which have misused their
powers.

The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender
laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise
they would not have thought of--when by the evils, on the one hand, and by
the secret instigations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were
become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed
by a revolution, or a civil war.  A general convention for mere commercial
purposes was moved for--the authors of this measure saw that the people's
attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that,
had the idea of a total change been started, probably no state would have
appointed members to the convention.  The idea of destroying ultimately, the
state government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been
admitted--a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power to
regulate trade was proposed.  This was pleasing to the commercial towns; and
the landed people had little or no concern about it.  September, 1786, a few
men from the middle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a
convention to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amending
the confederation--this was done before the delegates of Massachusetts, and
of the other states arrived--still not a word was said about destroying the
old constitution, and making a new one--The states still unsuspecting, and
not aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new
convention, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the
confederation--and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United
States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship
was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new
ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking--The States, I believe,
universally supposed the convention would report alterations in the
confederation, which would pass an examination in congress, and after being
agreed to there, would be confirmed by all the legislatures, or be rejected.
Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at the head of it
the first man in America.  In this appointment there was a mixture of
political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who
are esteemed aristocratical.  Here the favorite moment for changing the
government was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address.
Ten other states appointed, and tho' they chose men principally connected
with commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good
republican characters--had they all attended we should now see, I am
persuaded, a better system presented.  The non-attendance of eight or nine
men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever consider as a
very unfortunate event to the United States.--Had they attended, I am pretty
clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong
tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan.  There
would not have been so great an accumulation of powers, especially as to the
internal police of this country in a few hands as the constitution reported
proposes to vest in them--the young visionary men, and the consolidating
aristocracy, would have been more restrained than they have been.  Eleven
states met in the convention, and after four months close attention presented
the new constitution, to be adopted or rejected by the people.  The uneasy
and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of
government; but I presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any
constitution presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination;
and silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to
precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance--We shall view the
convention with proper respect--and, at the same time, that we reflect there
were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must recollect how
disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community
were represented--Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new
constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own
merits, or be condemned for its own defects.

In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is a plan of
accommodation--and that it is in this way only, and by giving up a part of
our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government founded in
freedom and compact.  This circumstance candid men will always keep in view,
in the discussion of this subject.

The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however,
calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government.

The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how far the
states can be consolidated into one entire government on free principles.  In
considering this question extensive objects are to be taken into view, and
important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in
all their consequences.  The happiness of the people at large must be the
great object with every honest statesman, and he will direct every movement
to this point.  If we are so situated as a people, as not to be able to enjoy
equal happiness and advantages under one government, the consolidation of the
states cannot be admitted.

There are three different forms of free government under which the
United States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to
determine to which we will direct our views.

1. Distinct republics connected under a federal head.  In this case the
respective state governments must be the principal guardians of the peoples
rights, and exclusively regulate their internal police; in them must rest the
balance of government.  The congress of the states, or federal head, must
consist of delegates amenable to, and removable by the respective states:
This congress must have general directing powers; powers to require men and
monies of the states; to make treaties; peace and war; to direct the
operations of armies, &c.  Under this federal modification of government, the
powers of congress would be rather advisory or recommendatory than coercive.

2. We may do away the federal state governments, and form or consolidate
all the states into one entire government, with one executive, one judiciary,
and one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives collected
from all parts of the union: In this case there would be a complete
consolidation of the states.

3. We may consolidate the states as to certain national objects, and
leave them severally distinct independent republics, as to internal police
generally.  Let the general government consist of an executive, a judiciary,
and balanced legislature, and its powers extend exclusively to all foreign
concerns, causes arising on the seas to commerce, imports, armies, navies,
Indian affairs, peace and war, and to a few internal concerns of the
community; to the coin, post offices, weights and measures, a general plan
for the militia, to naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies, leaving the
internal police of the community, in other respects, exclusively to the state
governments; as the administration of justice in all causes arising
internally, the laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the forming of
the militia according to a general plan prescribed.  In this case there would
be a complete consolidation, quoad certain objects only.

Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said in
its favor: The sovereignty of the nation, without coercive and efficient
powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be depended on to answer
the purposes of government; and in a congress of representatives of foreign
states, there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the
same hands.

As to the second, or complete consolidating plan, it deserves to be
carefully considered at this time by every American: If it be impracticable,
it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing our views ultimately
to it.

The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only
one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people.  I once had
some general ideas that the second plan was practicable, but from long
attention, and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that
this third plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed
upon.  Making this the standard to point out, with candor and fairness, the
parts of the new constitution which appear to be improper, is my object.  The
convention appears to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with
a view to collect all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire
government; and from its views in this respect, and from the tenacity of the
small states to have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated the
greatest defects in the proposed plan.

Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective
government cannot be extended over large territories, a few reflections must
evince, that one government and general legislation alone never can extend
equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs,
and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws
would be unreasonably invaded.  The United States contain about a million of
square miles, and in half a century will, probably, contain ten millions of
people; and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles.

Before we do away the state governments or adopt measures that will tend
to abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one entire government
several principles should be considered and facts ascertained:--These, and my
examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pursue in
my next.

Your's, &c.
HE FEDERAL FARMER.