Chapter VI


Civil Jurisdiction


         RIGHT OF DEFINING CIVIL LAW LODGED IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: In general.
-Once an area has been brought under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the Federal Government, in general only Federal civil laws, as well
as Federal criminal laws, are applicable in such area, to the exclusion
of State laws.  In Western Union Tel. co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909),
suit had been brought under a law of the State of Virginia imposing a
statutory civil penalty for nondelivery of a telegram, the telegram in
this instance having been addressed to the Norfolk Navy Yard.  The court
said (p. 278):

                 It is apparent from the history of the establishment of the Norfolk
Navy Yard, already given, that it is one of the places where the Congress
possesses exclusive legislative power.  It follows that the laws of the
State of Virginia, with the exception referred to in the acts of Assembly,
[right to execute civil and criminal process] cannot be allowed any operation
or effect within the limits of the yard.  The exclusive power of legislation
necessarily includes the exclusive jurisdiction.  The subject is so fully
discussed by Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court in
Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, that we need do no more
than refer to that case and the cases cited in the opinion.  It is of
the highest public importance that the jurisdiction of the State should
be resisted at the borders of those
                                                                                                   145
146                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 places where the power of exclusive legislation is vested in the
congress by the Constitution.  Congress already, with the design that
the places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall
not be freed from the restraints of the law, has enacted for them (Revised
Statutes, LXX, chapter #) an extensive criminal code ending with the
provision ( 5391) that where an offense is not  specially provided for
by any law United States, it shall be prosecuted in the courts of the
United States and receive the same punishment prescribed by the laws
of the State in which the place is situated for like offenses committed
within its jurisdiction.  We do not mean to suggest that the statute
before us creates a crime in the technical sense.  If it is desirable
that penalties should be inflicted for a default in the delivery of a
telegram occurring within the jurisdiction of the United States, Congress
only has the power to establish them.

         The civil authority of a State is extinguished over privately owned
areas and privately operated areas to the same extent as over federally
owned and operated areas when such areas are placed under the exclusive
legislative jurisdiction of the United States.

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         State reservation of authority.--State reservation of authority to
serve process in an area is not inconsistent with Federal exercise of
exclusive jurisdiction over the area.  It has been held, however, that
a reservation of the right to serve process does not permit a State to
serve a writ of attachment against either public or private property
located on an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction, and, it would
seem, it does not permit State service of a writ of habeas corpus with
respect to a person held on such an area.  It has also been held, on
the other hand, that a reservation to serve process enables service,
under a statue appointing the Secretary of State to receive service for
foreign corporations doing business within the State, upon a corporation
doing business within the boundaries of the State only upon an exclusive
Federal jurisdiction area.  And residence of a person on an exclusive
Federal jurisdiction area does not toll application of the State statute
of limitations where there has been a reservation of the right to serve
proc-

148                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

ess.  While a State may reserve various authority of a civil character
other than the right to serve process in transferring legislative jurisdiction
over an area to the Federal Government, such reservations result in Federal
possession of something less than exclusive jurisdiction, and the rights
of States with respect to the exercise of reserved authority in a Federal
area will be discussed a subsequent chapter.

         Congressional exercise of right.--statute relating to death or injury
by wrongful act.--While the Congress has, through the Assimilative Crimes
Act and Federal law defining various specific crimes, established a comprehensiv
e system of Federal laws for the punishment of crimes committed in areas
over which it has legislative jurisdiction, it has not made similar provision
for civil laws in such areas.  Indeed, the only legislative action of
the Federal Government toward providing Federal civil law in these areas
has been the adoption (in the general manner accomplished by the Assimilative
Crimes Act), for areas under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of
the United States, of the laws of the several States relating to right
of action for the death or injury of a person by the wrongful act or
neglect of another.
         The act of February 1, 1928, has a history relating back to 1919.
In that year Senator Walsh of Montana first introduced a bill (S. 206,
66th Cong., 1st Sess.), which was debated and passed by the Senate, but
on which the House took no action, having substantially the language
of the statute finally enacted.  Nearly identical bills were introduce
by the same senator and

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              149

passed by the Senate, without the filing of a report and without debate,
in the three succeeding Congresses.  However, not until a fifth bill
was presented by the senator (S. 1798, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.) did favorable
action ensue in the House, as well as in the Senate, and the bill became
law.
         On but two occasions were these bills debated.  When the first bill
(S. 206, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.) came up for consideration, on June 30,
1919, Senator Walsh said with respect to it:

                 The acts creating the various national parks give to the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over those territories, so that a question has
frequently arisen as to whether, in case one suffers death by the default
or willful act of another within those jurisdiction, there is any law
whatever under which the dependents of the deceased may recover against
the person answerable for his death.  For instance, in the Yellowstone
National Park quite a number of deaths have occurred in connection with
the transportation of passengers through the park, and a very serious
question arises as to whether, in a case of that character, there is
any law whatever under which the widow of a man who was killed by the
neglect, for instance, of the transportation company handling the passengers
in the park could recover.

                 The purpose of this proposed statute is to give a right of action
in all such cases exactly the same as is given by the law of the State
within which the reservation or other place within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States may be located.
         *          *          *          *          *
                 This is merely to give the same right of action in case within a
district which is within the exclusive jurisdic-

0150                             LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 tion of the United States as is given by the law of the State within
which it is located should the occurrence happen outside of the region
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

Senator Smoot interjected:

                 I understand from the Senator's statement what is desired to be accomplished
, but I was wondering whether it was a wise thing to do that at this
time.  An act of Congress authorizes the payment of a certain amount
of money to the widow or the heirs of an employee killed or injured in
the public service.  It is true that those amounts are usually paid by
special bills by way of claims against the Government when there is no
objection to them.  I do not know just how this bill, if enacted into
law, will affect the existing law.

To which Senator Walsh replied:

                 Let me say to the Senator that we are required to take care of the
cases to which he has referred, because they touch the rights of persons
in the employ of the United States, and their cause of action is against
the United States.  This bill does not touch cases of that kind at all.
 It merely touches cases of injury inflicted by some one other than the
Government.  Under this bill the Government will be in no wise liable
at all.

         During Senate consideration of the fifth of the series of bills (S.
1798, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.), on January 14, 1928, the following discussion
was had:

                 Mr. WALSH of Montana.  A similar bill has passed the Senate many
times, at least three or four, but for some reason or other it has not
succeeded in securing the approbation of the House.  It is intended practically
to

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              151

                 make the application of what is known as Lord Campbell's Act to places
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

                 Practically every State now has given a right of action to the legal
representatives of the dependent relatives of one who has suffered a
death by reason of the neglect or wrongful act of another, there being
no such recovery, it will be recalled, at common law.

                 There are a great many places in the United States under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States--the national parks, for instance.
 If a death should occur within those, within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, there would be no right of recovery on he part
of the representatives or dependents of the person who thus suffered
death as a result of the wrongful act or neglect of another.

                 In the State of the Senator I suppose a right of action is given
by the act of the Legislature of the State of Arkansas to the representatives
of one who thus suffers, but if the death occur within the Hot Springs
Reservation, being entirely within the jurisdiction of the United States,
no recovery could be had, because recovery can be had there only by virtue
of the laws of Congress.  The same applies to the Yellowstone National
Park in Wyoming and the Glacier National Park in Montana.

                 Mr. WALSH of Montana.  It would; so that if under the law of Arkansas
a right of recovery could be had if the death occurred outside of the
national park, the same right of action would exist if it occurred in
the national park.

                 Mr. BRUCE.  In other words, as I understand it, it is intended to
meet the common-law principle that a personal action dies with the death
of the person?

152                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         Mr. WALSH of Montana.  Exactly.

         Only a single written report was submitted (by the House Committee
on the Judiciary, on S. 1798) on any of the bills related to the act
of February 1, 1928.  In this it was stated:

                 This bill has passed the senate on three or four occasions, but has
never been reached for action in the House.  This bill gives a right
of action in the case of death of any person by neglect or wrongful act
of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States within the exterior boundaries of any
State.

                 It provides that a right of action shall exist as though the place
were under the jurisdiction of the State and that the rights of the parties
shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries
of which the national park or other Government reservation may be.  Under
the common law no right of action survived to the legal representatives
in case of death of a person by wrongful act or neglect of another.
This was remedied in England by what is known as Lord Campbell's Act,
and the states have almost without exception passed legislation giving
a right of action to the legal representatives or dependent relatives
of one who has suffered death by reason of the wrongful act of another.
 This bill will provide a similar remedy for places under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.

         It may be noted that neither the language of the 1928 act, nor the
legislative history of the act, set out above, cast much light on whether
the act constitutes a retrocession of a measure of jurisdiction to the
States, or an adoption of State law as Federal law.  But a retrocession,
it has been seen, requires State consent, and no consent is provided
for under this statute,

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unlike the case with repeat to Federal statutes providing for application
of State laws relating to workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation,
and other matters, where the Federal statute cannot be implemented without
some action by the State.  It is largely on this basis that the 1928
statute is here classified as a Federal adoption of State law, rather
than a retrocession.
         It may also be noted hat the debate on the bills, and the House report,
set out in pertinent part above, indicate that the purpose of the bill
was to furnish a remedy to survivors in the nature of that provided by
Lord Campbell's Act, and no reference is made to language in the title
of the bill, and in its text, suggesting that the bill applied to personal
injuries, as well as deaths, by wrongful act.  While the question whether
the act applies to personal injuries, as well as deaths, appears not
to have been squarely presented to the courts, for purposes of convenience,
only, the act is herein referred to as providing a remedy in both cases.
 In any event, however, it would clearly seem not to apply to cases of
damage to personal or real property.
         The statute adopting for exclusive jurisdiction areas State laws giving
a right of action for death or injury by wrongful act or neglect did
not, it was held by a case which led to further Federal legislation,
adopt a State's workmen's compensation

154                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

law.  Murray v. Gerrick & Co., et al., 291 U.S. 315 (1934).  An argument
to the contrary was answered by the court as follows (p. 318):

                 * * * This argument overlooks the fact that the federal statute referred
only to actions at law, whereas the state act abolished all actions at
law for negligence and substituted a system by which employers contribute
to a fund to which injured workmen must look for compensation.  The right
of action given upon default of the employer in respect of his obligation
to contribute to the fund is conferred as a part of the scheme of state
insurance and not otherwise.  The act of Congress vested in Murray no
right to sue the respondents, had he survived his injury.  Nor did it
authorize the State of Washington to collect assessments for its state
fund from an employer conducting work in the Navy Yard.  If it were held
that beneficiaries may sue, pursuant to the compensation law, we should
have the incongruous situation that this law is in part effective and
in part ineffective within the area under the jurisdiction of the federal
government.  Congress did not intend such a result.  On the contrary,
the purpose was only to authorize suits under a state statute abolishing
the common law rule that the death of the injured person abates the action
for negligence.

         It was also held in the Murray case that the 1928 Federal statute served
to make effective in Federal areas the law as revised from time to time
by the State, not merely the law in effect as of the date of transfer
of legislative jurisdiction to

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              155

the United States.  The issue was not presented, however, whether a State
statute enacted after the 1928 Federal statue would apply.
         State unemployment compensation and workmen's compensation laws may
be made applicable in such areas by authority of the Congress.  But while
the application of these laws has been made possible by Federal statutes,
these statutes, discussed more fully in chapter VII, infra, did not provide
Federal laws covering unemployment compensation; rather, they effect
a retrocession of sufficient jurisdiction to the States to enable them
to enforce and administer in Federal enclaves their State laws relating
to unemployment compensation and workmen's compensation.  The Federal
Government has similarly granted powers to the States for exercise in
Federal enclaves with respect to taxation, and these also will be discussed
in a subsequent chapter.

         Early apparent absence of civil law.--A careful search of the authorities
has failed to disclose recognition prior to 1885 of any civil law as
existing in areas under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the
United States.  Debates and other parts of the legislative history of
the Assimilative Crimes Act, indicating prevalence of a belief that in
the absence of Federal statutory law providing for punishment of criminal
acts such acts in exclusive jurisdiction areas could not be punished,
suggest the existence in that time of a similar belief that in the absence
of appropriate Federal statutes no civil law existed in such areas.

156                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         INTERNATIONAL LAW RULE: Adopted for areas under Federal legislative
jurisdiction.--In 1885 the United States Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the case of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. McGlinn, 114
U.S. 542, involving a cow which became a casualty on a railroad right
of way traversing fort Leavenworth reservation.  At the time that the
Federal Government had acquired legislative jurisdiction over the reservation
a Kansas law required railroad companies whose roads were not enclosed
by a fence to pay damages to the owners of all animals killed or wounded
by the engines or cars of the companies without reference to the existence
of any negligence.  A State court had held the law applicable to the
casualty involved in the McGlinn case.  The United States Supreme Court,
in affirming the judgment of the State court, explained as follows its
reasons for so doing (p. 546):

                 It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by
the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative
power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign
to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are
intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until
abrogated or changed by the new sovereign.  By the cession public property
passes from one government to the other, but private property remains
as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure
its peaceful use and enjoyment.  As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances,
and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions,
and constitution of the new government are at once displaced.  Thus,
upon a cession of political jurisdiction

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              157

                 and legislative power--and the latter is involved in the former-
to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established
religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel
and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory
force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country
on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of
the new government upon the same matters.  But with respect to other
laws affecting the possessio, use and transfer of property, and designed
to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health
and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule
is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by
direct action by the new government, they are altered or repealed.  American
Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542; Halleck, International Law, ch.
34,  14.

         The rule thus defined by the court had been applied previously to foreign
territories acquired by the United States (American Insurance Company
v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (1828)), but not until the McGlinn case was it
extended to areas within the States over which the Federal Government
acquired exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The McGlinn case has been
followed many times, of course; adoption of the international
158                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

law rule for areas under exclusive legislative jurisdiction has filled
a vacuum which would otherwise exist in the absence of Federal legislation,
and furnishes a code of civil law for Federal enclaves.

         Federalizes State civil law, including common law.--The rule serves
to federalize not only the statutory but the common law of a State.
Kniffen v. Hercules Powder Co., 164 Kan. 196, 188 P.2d 980 (1948); Kaufman
v. Hopper, 220 N.Y. 184. 115 N.E. 470 (1917), see also 151 App. Div.
28, 135 N.Y.Supp. 363 (1912), aff'd., 163 App. Div. 863, 146 N. Y. Supp.
1096 (1914); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. v. Parker, 152 Va. 484, 147 S.E. 461
(1929); Henry Bickel Co. v. Wright's Administratrix, 180 Ky. 181, 202
S.W.  672 (1918).  But it applies merely to the civil law, not the criminal
law, of a State.  In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C.C.D.Neb., 1896).  See also
22 Calif. L. Rev. 152, 164 (1934).

         Only laws existing at time of jurisdiction transfer federalized.--It
should be noted, however, that the international law rule brings into
force only the State laws in effect at the time the transfer of legislative
jurisdiction occurred, and later State enactments are not effective in
the Federal enclave.  So, in

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              159

Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929), the court charged
an innkeeper on a Federal reservation at Hot Springs, Arkansas, with
liability s an insurer of his guests' personal property against fire,
under the common law rule, which was in effect in that State at the time
legislative jurisdiction had passed to the United States over he area
involved, although Arkansas, like most or all States, had subsequently
modified this rule by statute so as to require a showing of negligence.
 The non-applicability to areas under exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction
 of State statutes enacted subsequent to the transfer of jurisdiction
to the Federal Government has the effect that the civil law applicable
in such areas gradually becomes obsolete, as demonstrated by the Arllington
Hotel Co. case, since the Federal Government has not legislated for such
areas except in the minor particulars already mentioned.

         CIRCUMSTANCES WHEREIN FORMER STATE LAWS INOPERATIVE: (A). By action
of the Federal Government.--That an act of Congress may constitute the
"direct action of the new government" mentioned in the McGlinn case which
will in validate former State laws in an area over which exclusive legislative
jurisdiction has been transferred to the Federal Government apparently
has not been the subject of litigation, undoubtedly because the matter
is so fundamental and self-evi-

160                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

dent.  In Webb v. J.G. White Engineering Corp., 204 Ala. 429, 85 So.
729 (1920), State laws relating to recovery for injury were held inapplicable
to an employee of a Federal contractor on an exclusive Federal jurisdiction
area on the ground that Federal legislation had pre-empted the field.
 It is not clear whether the same result would have obtained in the absence
of exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government over the area in
which the injury occurred.
         The "direct action of the new government" apparently may be action
of the Executive branch as well as of the Congress.  In the case of Anderson
v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R., 102 Neb. 578, 168 N.W. 196 (1918),
the facts were almost precisely as in the McGlinn case.  However, the
War Department had ordered the railroad not to fence the railroad right
of-way on the ground that such fencing would interfere with the drilling
 and maneuver of troops.  The defendant railroad was held not liable
in the absence of a showing of negligence.  The court said (102 Neb.
584):

                 The war department has decided that the fencing of the right of way
would impair the effectiveness of the territory for the purpose for which
the cession was made.  That department possesses peculiar and technical
skill and knowledge of the needs of the nation in the training of its
defenders, and of the necessary conditions to make the ceded territory
fit for the purpose for which it was acquired.  It is not for the state
or its citizens to interfere with the purposes for which control of the
territory was ceded, and, when the defendant was forbidden to erect the
fences by that department of the United States government lawfully in
control of the

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              161

                 reservation, no other citizen can complain of non-performance of
held defendant guilty of a violation of law.

         (b)     Where activity by State officials required.--An apparent exception
to the international law rule is concerned with State laws which require
administrative activity on the part of State officials.  In Stewart &
Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940), the question was presented as to
whether certain safety requirements prescribed by the New York Labor
Law applied to a post office building which was being constructed in
an area over which the Federal Government had exclusive legislative jurisdiction
.  An employee of a contractor engaged in the construction of the New
York City Post Office fell from the building and was killed.  His administratrix
, in an action of tort against the contractor, narrowed the scope of
the charges of negligence until there finally was alleged only the violation
of a subsection of the New York Labor Law which required the planking
of floor beams.  The Supreme Court of the United States, in upholding
a judgment for the administratrix based upon a finding that the Labor
Law was applicable, said (pp. 101-103):

                 It is urged that the provisions of the Labor Law contain numerous
administrative and other provisions which cannot be relevant to federal
territory.  The Labor Law does have a number of articles.  Obviously
much of their language is directed at situations that cannot arise in
the territory.  With the domestication in the excised area of the entire
applicable body of state municipal law much of the state law must necessarily
be appropriate.  Some sections authorize quasi-judicial proceedings or
administrative action and may well have no validity in the federal area.
 It is not a question here of the exercise of state administrative authority
in federal territory.  We do not agree, however, that because the Labor
Law is not applicable as a whole, it follows that none of its sections
are.  We have in Collins v. Yosemite Park Company that the sections of
a Cali-

162                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 fornia statute which levied excises on sales of liquor in Yosemite
National Park were enforceable in the Park, while sections of the same
statute providing regulation of the Park liquor traffic through licenses
were unenforceable.

         In view of the decisions in the Sadrakula and Gerrick cases, the conclusion
is inescapable that State laws which contemplate or require administrative
action are not effective under the international law rule.  Clearly,
the States receive no authority to operate administrative machinery within
areas under exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction through the adoption
of State law as Federal law for the areas.  Therefore, adoption as Federal
law of a State law requiring administrative action would be of little
effect unless the Federal Government also established administrative
machinery paralleling that of the State.  Instead of providing for the
execution of such State laws as Federal law, the Federal Government has
authorized the States to extend the application of certain such laws
to areas of exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction.  Thus, as has
been indicated, the States have been authorized to extend their workmen's
compensation and unemployment compensation laws to such Federal areas.
 However, little or no provision has been made for either State of Federal
administration of laws in various other fields.

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         (c)     Inconsistency with Federal law.--In Hill v. Ring Construction
Co., et al., 19 F.Supp. 434 (W.D.Mo., 1937), which involved a contract
question, the court refused to give effect under the international law
rule to a statute which had been in effect in the State involved at the
time legislative jurisdiction was transferred to the federal Government.
 This statute provided that thirteen and one-half cubic feet (rather
than the mathematically provable 27 cubic feet) constituted a cubic yard.
 In refusing to apply the statute, the court stated it was inconsistent
with the "national common law" which, according to the court, provides
that "two added to two were always four and a cubic yard was a cubic
yard."  The court makes clear, however, that it strained to this conclusion.
         There appears to be no reported decision except that in the Hill case,
supra, wherein a State civil law has been declared in applicable as Federal
law under the international law rule in an area under exclusive Federal
jurisdiction because of its inconsistency with other law of the new Federal
sovereign.  There are similarly no cases holding State law applicable
notwithstanding such inconsistency.  The rule, as it was definition the
McGlinn case, is very clear on this subject, however, and State civil
laws inconsistent with Federal laws would fall under the international
law rule as State criminal laws inconsistent with Federal laws fall under
the Assimilative Crimes Act.

164                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         INTERNATIONAL LAW RULE IN RETROCESSION OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION:
A question which has not as yet been considered by the courts is the
extent to which, if to any, the international law rule is applicable
to areas which had been subject to exclusive legislative jurisdiction,
and over which concurrent jurisdiction has been retroceded to the State.
         The fact hat concurrent jurisdiction only is retroceded, would, as
a matter of statutory construction, suggest that Federal law currently
in effect in the area is unaffected.  The applicable Federal criminal
laws would not, presumably, be repealed or suspended by a retrocession
of concurrent jurisdiction, nor any other Federal statutes which were
enacted for areas  Federal legislative jurisdiction.  Similarly, it might
be argued, such retrocession of concurrent jurisdiction does not serve
to repeal Federal laws which were adopted pursuant to the international
law rule.  While it is a seeming anomaly to have two sets of laws governing
civil matters, it seems no more anomalous than to have two sets of criminal
laws applicable to the same crime, and that, it has been seen, is a state
of fact, to which reasonably satisfactory adjustment appears to have
been made.  However, an adjustment to two sets of civil laws would seen
more difficult, and, indeed, perhaps it would not be entirely possible.
         The considerations supporting a conclusion that laws federalized under
the international law rule would not survive a retrocession of concurrent
jurisdiction to the State have their bases in the fact that international
law rule is applied as a matter of necessity, in order to avoid a vacuum
in the area which has been the subject of the jurisdictional transfer.
 When the need for the application of the rule no longer exists, it is
logical to assume, the laws which have been adopted thereunder are no
longer effective. merit of this conclusion rests on practical considerations
as well as logic, and these considerations would seem to make the conclusion
outweigh the contrary position, based solely on considerations of logic.

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              165

         STATE AND FEDERAL VENUE DISCUSSED: The civil laws effective in an area
of exclusive Federal jurisdiction are Federal law, notwithstanding their
derivation from State laws, and a cause arising under such laws may be
brought in or removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or
28 of the former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28,
United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil actions
arising under the "* * * laws * * * of the United States" where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.  Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (W.D.Wash., 1916).  To
the same effect as the holding in the Steele case, and following the
decisions in the McGlinn and Arlington Hotel Co. cases, were those in
Coffman v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., et al., 24 F.Supp.  581 (W.D.Mo.,
1938), and in Jewell v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati, et al.,
28 F.Supp. 366 (W.D.Mo., 1938), rev'd. on other grounds, 111 F.2d 305
(C.A. 8, 1940).  In each of these it was decided that laws of the State
(Missouri) existing at the time of Federal acquisition of legislative
jurisdiction over an area became "laws of the United States" within that
area.  However, in a related case in the same district (Jewell v. Cleveland
Wrecking Co., 28 F.Supp. (W.D.Mo., 1938)), another judge appears to have
rejected this view of the law on grounds not entirely clear but having
their bases in the fact that the trial in the McGlinn case, supra, occurred
in a State court (it involved a transitory action).

         Transitory actions may be brought in State courts notwithstanding that
they arise out of events occurring in an exclusive Federal jurisdiction
area.  Ohio River contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917).  Indeed,
unless there is involved one of

166                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

the special situations (admiralty, maritime, and prize cases, bankruptcy
matters and proceedings, etc.), as to which Federal district courts are
given original jurisdiction by chapter 85 of title 18, United States
Code, only State courts, and not Federal district courts, may take cognizance
of an action arising out of events occurring in an exclusive Federal
jurisdiction area unless the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.  But State authority
to serve process in exclusive Federal jurisdiction areas is limited to
process relating to activities occurring outside of the areas, although
a number of States now reserve broader authority relating to service
of process, so that unless process can be served on the defendant outside
the exclusive Federal jurisdiction area it appears that even a transitory
action arising in such an area could not be maintained in a State court.
 In such a case it appears that no remedy whatever exists, even with

                                         CIVIL JURISDICTION                              167

respect to a transitory cause of action, where the matter in controversy
does not involve the Federal jurisdiction area, generally is held as
not cognizable in State courts.  So, except, as local actions may come
within the purview of the limited (except in the District of Columbia)
authority of Federal district courts to entertain them, no remedy is
available in many types of such actions arising in Federal exclusive
jurisdiction areas.  Divorce actions and actions for probate of wills,
it will be seen, have constituted a special problem in this respect.
         Local actions pending in the State courts at the time of transfer of
legislative jurisdiction from a State to the Federal Government should
be proceeded in to a conclusion, it has been held.  Van Ness v. Bank
of the United States, 13 Pet. 15 (1839).

         FEDERAL STATUTES AUTHORIZING APPLICATION OF STATE LAW: As has been
indicated, the federal Government has authorized the extension of State
workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation laws to areas of
exclusive legislative jurisdiction.  In addition, the States have been
authorized to extend certain of their tax laws to such areas.  As a consequence,
 areas of exclusive legislative jurisdiction are as completely subject
to certain State laws as areas in which the Federal Government has only
a proprietorial interest.  The operation and effect of the extension
of these State laws is considered more fully in chapter VII.