Chapter V


Criminal Jurisdiction


         RIGHT OF DEFINING AND PUNISHING FOR CRIMES: Exclusive Federal jurisdiction.
Areas over which the Federal Government has acquired exclusive legislative
jurisdiction are subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the
United States.  Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S.19 (1939); United States v.
Watkins, 22 F.2d 437 (N.D.Cal 1927).  That the States can neither define
nor punish for crimes in such areas is made clear in the
                                                                                                 105

106                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

case of In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C.C.N.D.Neb., 1896), (p. 40):

                 * * * The cession of jurisdiction over a given territory takes the
latter from within, and places it without, the jurisdiction of the ceding
sovereignty.  After a state has parted with its political jurisdiction
over a given tract of land, it cannot be said that acts done thereon
are against the peace and dignity of the state, or are violations of
its laws; and the state certainly cannot claim jurisdiction criminally
be reason of acts done at place beyond,or not within, its territorial
jurisdiction, unless by treaty or statute it may have retained jurisdiction
over its own citizens, and even then the jurisdiction is only over the
person as a citizen. * * *

The criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government extends to private
land over which legislative jurisdiction has been vested in the Government,
as well as to federally owned lands.  United States v. Unzenuta, supra;
see also Petersen v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (C.A. 9, 1951), cert.den.,
342 U.S. 885.  Indeed, the Federal Government's power derived from exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over an area may extend beyond

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the boundaries of the area, as may be necessary to make exercise of the
Government's jurisdiction effective; thus, the Federal Government may
punish a person not in the exclusive jurisdiction area for concealment
of his knowledge concerning the commission of a felony within the area.
 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 426429 (1821).
         In Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773 (C.A. 8, 1906), the court
said (p. 777):

                 Instances of relinquishment and acceptance of criminal jurisdiction
by state Legislatures and the national Congress, respectively, over forts,
arsenals, public buildings, and other property of the United States situated
within the states, are common, and their legality has never, so far as
we know, been questioned.

         On the other hand, while the Federal Government has power under various
provisions of the Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, certain
acts or omissions occurring anywhere in the United States, it has no
power to punish for various other crimes, jurisdiction over which is
retained by the States under our Federal-State system of government,
unless such crimes occur on areas as to which legislative jurisdiction
has been vested in the Federal Government.  The absence of jurisdiction
in a State, or in the Federal Government, over a criminal act occurring
in an area as to which only the other of these governments has legislative
jurisdiction is demonstrated by the case of United States v. Tully, 140
Fed. 899 (C.C.D.Mont.,

108                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

1905).  Tully had been convicted by a State court in Montana of first
degree murder, and sentenced to be hanged.  The Supreme Court of the
State reversed the conviction on the ground that the homicide had occurred
on a military reservation over which exclusive jurisdiction was vested
in the Federal Government.  The defendant was promptly indicted in the
Federal court, but went free as the result of a finding that the Federal
Government did not have legislative jurisdiction over the particular
land on which the homicide had occurred.  The Federal court said (id.
p. 905):

                 It is unfortunate that  a murderer should go unwhipped of justice,
but it would be yet more unfortunate if any court should assume to try
one charged with a crime without jurisdiction over the offense.  In this
case, in the light of the verdict of the jury in the state court, we
may assume that justice would be done the defendant were he tried and
convicted by any court and executed pursuant to its judgment.  But in
this court it would be the justice of the vigilance committee wholly
without the pale of the law.  The fact  that the  defendant is to be
discharged may furnish a text for the thoughtless or uninformed to say
that a murderer has been turned loose upon a technicality; but this is
not a technicality.  It goes to the very right to sit in judgment. *
* * These sentiments no doubt appealed with equal force to the Supreme
Court of Montana, and it is to its credit that it refused to lend its
aid to the execution of one for the commission of an act which, in its
judgment, was not cognizable under the laws of its state; but I cannot
being myself to the conclusion reached by that able court, and it is
upon the judgment and conscience of this court that the matter of jurisdiction
here must be decided.

The United States and each State are in many respects separate sovereigns,
and ordinarily one cannot enforce the laws of the other.

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         State and local police have no authority to enter an exclusive Federal
area to make investigations, or arrests, for crimes committed within
such areas since Federal, not State, offenses are involved.  Only Federal
law enforcement officials, such as representatives of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and United States marshals and their deputies, would
be authorized to investigate such offenses and make arrests in connection
with them.  The policing of Federal exclusive jurisdiction areas must
be accomplished by Federal personnel, and an offer of a municipality
to police a portion of a road on such an area could not be accepted by
the Federal official in charge of the area, as police protection by a
municipality to such an area would be inconsistent with Federal exclusive
jurisdiction.

         Concurrent Federal and State criminal jurisdiction.--There are, of
course, Federal areas as to which a State, in ceding legislative jurisdiction
to the United States, has reserved some measure of jurisdiction, including
criminal jurisdiction, concurrently to itself.  In general, where a crime
has been committed in an areas over which the Untied States and a State
have concurrent criminal jurisdiction, both governments may try the accused
without violating the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.

110                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

333 (1907), held that the same acts constituting a crime cannot, after
a defendant's acquittal or conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction
of the Federal Government, be made the basis of a second trial of the
defendant for that crime in the same or in another court, civil or military,
of the same government.  However, where the same act is a crime under
both State and Federal law, the defendant may be punished under each
of them.  Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).  It was stated by
the court in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), (p. 382):

                 It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and
state sovereignties is an offence against the peace and dignity of both
and may be punished by each.  The Fifth Amendment, like all the other
guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings
by the Federal Government, Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, and the double
jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under authority of
the Federal Government after a first trial for the same offense under
the same authority. * * *

         It is well settled, of course, that where two tribunals have concurrent
jurisdiction that which first takes cognizance of a matter has the right,
in general, to retain it to a conclusion, to the exclusion of the other.
 The rule seems well stated in Mail v. Maxwell, 107 Ill. 554 (1883),(p.
561):

                 Where one court has acquired jurisdiction, no other court, State
or Federal, will, in the absence of supervising or appellate jurisdiction,
interfere, unless in pursuance of some statute, State or Federal, providing
for such interference.

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Other courts have held similarly.  There appears to be some doubt concerning
the status of a court-martial as a court, within the meaning of the Judicial
Code, however.
         Law enforcement on areas of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.-
The General Services Administration is authorized by statute to appoint
its uniformed guards as special policemen, with the same powers as sheriffs
and constables to enforce Federal laws enacted for the protection of
persons and property, and to prevent beaches of the peace, to suppress
affrays or unlawful assemblies, and to enforce rules made by the General
Services Administration for properties under its jurisdiction; but the
policing powers of such special policemen are restricted to Federal property
over which the United States has acquired exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.
  Upon the application of the head of any Federal department or agency
having property of the United States under its administration or control
and over which the United States has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction,
the General Services Administration is authorized by statute to detail
any such special policeman for the protection of such property and, if
it is deemed desirable, to extend to such property the applicability
of regulations governing property promulgated by the General Services
Administration.  The General Services Administration is authorized by
the same statute to utilize the facilities of existing Federal law-enforcement
agencies, and, with the consent of any State or local agency, the facilities
and services of such State or local law enforcement agencies.
         Although the Department of the Interior required protection for an
installation housing important secret work, the General

112                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

Services Administration was without authority to place uniformed guards
on the premises in the absence in the United States of exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction over the property, and notwithstanding the impropriety of
permitting the policing of the property by local officials, if they were
willing, without necessary security clearances.
         Civilian Federal employees may be assigned to guard duty on Federal
installations, but there is no Federal statue (other than that appertaining
to General Services Administration and three statutes of even less effect
-16 U.S.C. 559 (Forest Service), and 16 U.S.C. 10 and 10a (National Park
Service)) conferring any special authority on such guards.  They are
not peace officers with the usual powers of arrest; and have no greater
powers of arrest than private citizens.  As citizens, they may protect
their own lives and property and the safety of others, and as agents
of the Government they have a special right to protest the property of
the Government.  For both these purposes they may bear arms irrespective
of State law against bearing arms.  Such guards, unless appointed as
deputy sheriffs (where the State has at least concurrent criminal jurisdiction),
 or deputy marshals (where the United States has at least concurrent
criminal jurisdiction), have
no

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more authority than other private individuals so far as making arrests
is concerned.
         State and local officers may, by special Federal statute, preserve
the peace and make arrests for crimes under the laws of States, upon
immigrant stations, and the jurisdiction of such officers and of State
and local courts has been extended to such stations for the purposes
of the statute.

         Partial jurisdiction.--In some instances States in granting to the
Federal Government a measure of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over
an area have reserved the right to exercise, only by themselves, or concurrently
 by themselves as well as by the Federal Government, criminal jurisdiction
over the area.  In instances of complete State retention of criminal
jurisdiction, whether with respect to all matters or with respect to
a specified category of matters, the rights of the States, of the United
States, and of any defendants, with respect to crimes as to which State
jurisdiction is so retained are as indicated in this chapter for areas
as to which the Federal Government has no criminal jurisdiction.  In
instances of concurrent State and Federal criminal jurisdiction with
respect to any matters the rights of all parties are, of course, determined
with respect to such matters according to the rules of law generally
applicable in areas of concurrent jurisdiction.  Accordingly, there is
no

114                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

body of law specially applicable to criminal activities in areas under
the partial legislative jurisdiction of the United States.
         State criminal jurisdiction retained.--State criminal jurisdiction
extends into areas owned or occupied by the Federal Government, but as
to which the Government has not acquired exclusive legislative jurisdiction
with respect to crimes.  And as to many areas owned by the Federal Government
for its various purposes it has not acquired legislative jurisdiction.
 The Forest service of the Department of Agriculture, for example, in
accordance with a provision of Federal law (16 U.S.C. 480), has not accepted
the jurisdiction proffered by the statutes of many States, and the vast
majority of Federal forest lands are held by the Federal Government in
a proprietorial status only.
         The Federal Government may not prosecute for ordinary crimes committed
in such areas.  Federal civilians who may

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be appointed as guards in the areas do not have police powers, but possess
only the powers of arrest normally had by any citizen unless they receive
appointments as State or local police officers.

         Acts committed partly in area under State jurisdiction.--Where a crime
has been in part committed in a Federal exclusive legislative jurisdiction
area, the States in some instances have asserted jurisdiction.  It was
held in Commonwealth v. Rohrer, 37Pa. D. and C. 410 (1937), that a dealer
furnishing milk for use at a veterans' hospital was subject to the provisions
of the Milk Control Board Law.  The court was of the opinion that while
the State had no jurisdiction with respect to a crime committed wholly
within the area over which legislative jurisdiction had been ceded to
the Federal Government for the hospital, it did have jurisdiction of
a crime the essential elements of which were committed within the State,
even though other elements thereof were committed within the ceded territory.
 Two more recent decisions of the Supreme Court (i.e., Penn Dairies,
Inc., et al. v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261
(1943), and Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of
California, 318 U.S.  285 (1943)) suggest that only where the federal
Government does not have exclusive legislative jurisdiction would a State
have such authority.  It has been held, however, that even where acts
are done wholly on Federal property, a State property, a State prosecution
is proper where the effects of the acts are felt in an area under State
jurisdiction.  People v. Commonwealth Sanitation Co., 1007 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1951); cf. State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331 (1884).
         On the other hand, transportation through a State for delivery to an
area, within the boundaries of the State, which is

116                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States has been held not
to be a violation of laws prohibiting the importation into the State
of the matter transported.

         Retrial on change in jurisdiction.--Where a person is convicted of
a crime in a State court and the territory in which the crime was committed
is subsequently ceded to the United States, he may be properly retried
or sentenced in the State court, it was held in Commonwealth v. Vaughn,
64 Pa. D & C. 320 (1948).  The court said (p. 322):

                 * * * The act when done was a violation of the law of this Commonwealth
which is still in full force and effect, done within its territorial
jurisdiction; the Commonwealth had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and obtained jurisdiction of the person by proper process, and its proper
officer proceeded with legal action in the proper court, which court
has never relinquished its jurisdiction, so obtained. * * * When the
jurisdiction of a court has legally and properly attached to the person
and subject matter in a legal proceeding, such jurisdiction continues
until the cause is fully an completely disposed of * * *.

The court points out that if the subject matter (in this case, the crime)
is wiped out the court loses its jurisdiction.  The crime would no longer
exist and no one can be punished for a crime which does not exist at
time of trial therefor, or of meting out punishment.

         SERVICE OF STATE CRIMINAL PROCESS: In general.--That State criminal
process may extend into areas owned or occupied by the United States
but not under its legislative jurisdiction is well set out in the case
of Cockburn v. Willman, 301 Mo. 575, 257 S.W. 458 (1923), (p. 587):

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                 The mere fact that he was territorial within the confines of a Government
reservation at the time the warrant was served upon him did not render
him immunity exists only when it appears in the cession by the State
to the National Government that the former has divested itself of all
power over the place or territory in regard to the execution of process
or the arrest and detention of persons found thereon who are charged
with crime.

         Right by Federal grant.--The immunity of persons in areas under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Government from service upon them
of State process occasioned great concern at the constitutional ratifying
conventions that such areas might become havens for felons.  At an early
date, Congress provided that in lighthouse and certain related areas
criminal and civil process might be served by the States notwithstanding
the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction by the Federal Government over
such sites.

         Right by State reservation.--States have commonly included in their
consent and cession statutes a reservation of the power to serve civil
and criminal process in the areas to which such statutes relate, and
all such State statutes which are currently in effect contain such reservations.
  The words of reservation vary, but usually are contained in a clause
following the cession language and are worded approximately as follows:

         * * * this state, however, reserving the right to execute

118                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 its process, both criminal and civil, within such territory.

         Reservations to serve process not inconsistent with exclusive jurisdiction.
-The reservation by a State of the right to serve criminal and civil
process in an area over which such Federal jurisdiction exists is not,
however, inconsistent with the exercise by the Federal Government of
exclusive jurisdiction over the area, and a State does not by such a
reservation acquire jurisdiction to punish for a crime committed within
a ceded area.  United States v. Travers, 28 Fed. Cas. 204, No. 16,537
(C.C.D.Mass., 1814); United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. cas. 646, No. 14,867
(C.C.D.R.I., 1819).  Indeed, it has been said that process served under
a reservation becomes, quoad hoc, process of the United States, and that
when a State officer acts to execute process on a Federal enclave he
acts under the authority of the United States, but these statements appear
inconsistent with the generally prevailing view of reservations to serve
process as retention by the State of its sovereign authority.  Even,
as is often the case, where a State retains "concurrent jurisdiction,"
to serve civil

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and criminal process, or the right to serve such process as if jurisdiction
over lands "had not been ceded," the quoted words have been construed
not to give the State jurisdiction to punish persons for offenses committed
within the ceded territory.  United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646,
No. 14,867 (C.C.D.R.I., 1819); Lasher v. State, 30 Tex. Cr.App. 387 17
S.W. 1064 (1891); Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811).  In the Cornell
case, supra, the United States purchased certain lands in Rhode Island
for military purposes.  The State gave its consent to these purchases,
reserving, however, the right to execute all civil and criminal processes
on the ceded lands, in the same way as if they had not been a reservation
of concurrent jurisdiction by the State.  The court answered this in
the negative as follows (pp. 648-649):

                 In its terms it certainly does not contain any reservation of concurrent
jurisdiction or legislation.  It provides only that civil and criminal
processes, issued under the authority of the state, which must of course
be for acts done within, and cognizable by, the state, may be executed
within the ceded lands, notwithstanding the cession.  Not a word is said
from which we can infer that it was intended that the state should have
a right to punish for acts done within the ceded lands.  The whole apparent
object is answered by considering the clause as meant to prevent these
lands from becoming a sanc-

120                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 turary for fugitives from justice, for acts done within the acknowledged
jurisdiction of the state.  Now there is nothing incompatible with the
exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one state, that it should permit
another state, in such cases, to execute its processes within its limits
* * *.

And reservation of right to "execute" process, it has been held, retains
no more authority in the State than a reservation to "serve" process,
even in the absence of the word "exclusive" in the description of the
quantum of jurisdiction ceded to the United States.  Rogers v. Squier,
 F.2d 948 (C.A. 9, 1946), cert. den., 330 U.S. 840.
         The Supreme Court of Nevada has held (State ex rel. Jones v. Mack,
23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897)) that exception from a cession of the
"administration of the criminal laws" reserved to the State only the
right to serve process, and a similar holding with respect to a similar
California statute was once made by a Federal court; but at least on
five occasions Attorneys General of the United States have ruled that
such language gave a State cognizance of criminal offenses against its
laws in the place ceded.  It has also been held that a reservation to
serve process for "any cause there [in the ceded area] or elsewhere in
the state arising, where such cause comes properly under the jurisdiction
of the laws of this state," merely reserved he right to serve process,
and was not inconsistent with a transfer of exclusive jurisdiction.
         In People v. Hillman, 246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927), it was held
that the courts of the State of New York had no jurisdiction over a robbery
committed on a highway which passed through the West Point Military Reservation.
  Ownership of the land had been acquired by the United States, and the
State had ceded jurisdiction over the land, reserving the

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           121

right to serve civil and criminal process thereon and the right of occupancy
of the highways.  The latter reservation, the court said, should not
be construed as a reservation of political dominion and legislative authority
over the highways but meant merely that the State reserved the right
to appropriate for highway purposes the customary proportion of land
embraced in the tract.

         Warrant of arret deemed process.--By the very nature of the purposes
which the State reservations to serve criminal and civil process were
intended to carry out, such reservations include the right to execute
a warrant of arrest, including a warrant issued on a request for extradition.
 Such warrants are a form of legal process.  However, various Federal
instrumentalities have regulations governing the manner in which such
process shall be served, and even in the absence of formal regulations
on the subject, the service of process may

122                      LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

not be accomplished in manner such as to constitute an interference with
an instrumentality of the Federal Government.
         Arrest without warrant not deemed service of process.--It has been
held that an arrest without a warrant may not be effected by a State
police officer in an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction, for a
crime committed off the area, since such an arrest does not involve service
of process.  A reservation to make such arrest might, of course, be made.
 State officials may enter an exclusive Federal jurisdiction area, to
make an investigation related to an offense committed off the area, only
in manner such as will not interfere with an instrumentality of the Federal
Government, and in accordance with any Federal regulations for this purpose.

         Coroner's inquest.--Various authorities have held that a State cannot
render coroner service in an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction,
but in an early case (County of Allegheny v. McClung, 53 Pa. 482 (1867)),
it was suggested that a coroner's inquest might constitute criminal process.

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         Writ of habeas corpus.--In three early cases a reservation of the right
to serve process was construed as giving authority to a State to serve
a writ of habeas corpus upon a federal military officer with respect
to his alleged illegal detention, under color of Federal authority, of
a person upon a Federal enclave (State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841);
In re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471 (N.Y., 1827); and Commonwealth  v. Cushing,
11 Mass. 67 (1814))>  The lack of jurisdiction is State courts to inquire
by habeas corpus into the propriety of the confinement of persons held
under the authority or color of authority of the United States has since
been firmly fixed and confirmed.  Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859),
In re Tarble, 13 Wall. 397 (1871), Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950).  Nor, it would seen, may a writ of habeas corpus out of a State
court in any case lie under the usual State reservation to serve process
with reference to a person held in an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction,
 although his holding be not under Federal authority (e.g., the holding
of a child by an adult claiming parental authority), since such a reservation
permits service only with respect to matters arising outside the exclusive
jurisdiction area.
         It has been held, on the other hand, that a writ of habeas corpus properly
might issue from a Federal court to discharge from the custody of a State
official a prisoner held for a crime indicated to have been committed
in an area which, while within the State, was under the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction of the United States.  Ex parte Tatem, 23 Fed. Cas. 708,
No. 13,759 (E.D.Va., 1877).  The court issued the writ reluctantly in
the Tatem case, however, and in In re Bradley, 96 Fed. 969 (C.C.S.D.Cal.,
1898), the court said (p. 970):

                 Unquestionably, the circuit and district courts of the United States
may, on habeas corpus, discharge from custody one who is restrained of
his liberty in violation of the constitution of the United States, even
though

124                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 he is so restrained under state process to answer for an alleged
crime against the state.  Rev. St.  753.  This power, however, in the
federal judiciary, "to arrest the arm of the state authorities, and to
discharge a person held by them, is one of great delicacy"   (Ex parte
Thompson, 23 Fed. Cas. p. 1016), and ought not to be exercised in any
case where suitable relief can be had through the regular procedure of
the state tribunals * * *.

The court said further (p. 971):

                 Assuming--without, however, deciding--that the allegations of the
petition, in the case at bar, show, that the imprisonment of the petition
is without due process of law, and violative of the federal constitution,
they do not, as held in Ex parte Royall, supra, "suggest any reason why
the state court of original jurisdiction may not, without interference
upon the part of the courts of the United States, pass upon the question
which is raised," as to the lack of jurisdiction in the state government
over the land or place in question.

         The Supreme Court has ruled that whether the United States had exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over land where an alleged crime was committed
is to be determined by the court to which the indictment was returned,,
and no by writ of habeas corpus in connection with proceedings for the
removal of the accused from another jurisdiction for trial.  Rodman v.
Pothier, 264 U.S. 399 (1924).  Presumable this rule would apply to extradition
as well as to removal proceedings.

         FEDERAL CRIMES ACT OF 1790:  Effects limited.--Among the problems which
early resulted from the creation of Federal enclaves was that of the
administration of criminal law over these areas.  Once these areas were
withdrawn from State jurisdiction, in the absence of congressional legislation
they were left without criminal law.  Congress, in order to correct this
situ-

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           125

ation, passed the first Federal Crimes Act, in 1790.  However, this act
defined only the more serious crimes, such sa murder, manslaughter, maiming,
etc., punishing their commission in areas under the "sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."  Persons who committed other offenses
in these areas escaped unpunished.
         The gravity of the situation was indicated by Joseph Story in his comment
on a bill which he wrote inn 1816 "to extend the judicial system of the
United States."  He stated, in part, as follows:

                 * * * Few, very few of the practical crimes, (if I may so say,) are
now punishable by statutes, and if the courts have no general common
law jurisdiction (which is a vexed question,) they are wholly dispunishable.
 The State Courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed on the high
seas, or in places ceded to the United States.  Rapes, arsons, batteries,
and a host of other crimes, may in these p;aces be now committed with
impunity.  Surely, in naval yards, arsenals, forts, and dockyards, and
on the high seas, a common law jurisdiction is indispensable.  Suppose
a conspiracy to commit treason in any of these places, by civil persons,
how can the crime be punished?  These are cases where the United States
have an exclusive local jurisdiction.  And can it be less fit that the
Government should have power to protect itself in all other places where
it exercises a legitimate authority?  That Congress have power to provide
for all crimes against the United States, is incontestable. * * *

126                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

These Federal areas within the States over which Congress had exclusive
jurisdiction had become, it would seem from Story's comment, a criminals'
paradise.  The act of 1790, supra, defining and punishing for certain
crimes on such areas left many grossly reprehensible acts undefined and
unpunished, the States no longer had jurisdiction over these areas, and
the Federal courts had no common law jurisdiction.

         ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES STATUTES: Assimilative Crimes Act of 1825.--In
order, therefore, to provide a system of criminal law for ceded areas,
Congress, in 1825, passed the first assimilative crimes statute.  This
was section 3 of the act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 115, which provided:

                 AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That, if any offence shall be committed
in any of the places aforesaid, the punishment of which offence is not
specially provided for by any law of the United States, such offence
shall, upon a conviction in any court of the United States having cognisance
thereof, be liable to, and receive the same punishment as the laws of
the state in which such fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory,
or magazine, or other place, ceded as aforesaid, is situated, provide
for the like offence when committed within the body of any county of
such state.

         Mr. Wbster, who sponsored this bill,is indicated to have explained
the purpose of its third section as follows (register of Debates in Congress,
18th Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 24, 1825, Gales & Seaton, Vol. I, p. 338):

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           127

                 * * * it must be obvious, that, where the jurisdiction of a small
place, containing only a few hundreds of people, (a navy yard for instance,)
was ceded to the United States, some provision was required for the punishment
of offences; and as, from the use to which the place was to be put, some
crime were likely to be more frequently committed than others, the committee
had thought it sufficient to provide for these, and then to leave the
residue to be punished by the laws of the state in which the yard, &c.
might be.  He [Webster] was persuaded that the people would not view
it as an hardship, that the great class of minor offences should continue
to be punished in the same manner as they had been before the cession.

         In United States v. Davis, decided in 1829, the court stated the purpose
of the act of 1825, at page 784:

                 The object of the act of 1825 was to provide for the punishment of
offences committed in places under the jurisdiction of the United States,
where the offence was not before punishable by the courts of the United
States under the actual circumstances of its commission.  * * *

         The act of 1825 was construed by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (1832).  An act of 1829 of the New York legislature
was held not to apply under the Assimilative Crimes Act to the West Point
Military Reservation, situated in the State of New York.  Chief Justice
Marshall ruled that the act of 1825 was to be limited  to the adoption
of States laws in effect at the time of its enactment.  Any State laws
enacted after March 3, 1825, could not be adopted by the act and would
therefore be of no effect in a Federal enclave.  It appeared, therefore,
that the assimilative crimes statute would have to be re-enacted periodically
in order to keep the criminal laws of Federal enclaves abreast with State
criminal laws.

128                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         In United States v. Barney, 24 Fed. Cas. 1011, No. 14,524 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.,
1866), the court held that the act of 1825 applied only to those places
which were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States at the
time the act was passed.  Therefore, the act would not apply to any areas
ceded to the Federal Government by the States after March 3, 1825.  It
was similarly apparent then that any areas ceded by the States to the
Federal Government after the date of the act of 1825 were left without
criminal law except as to those few offenses defined in the Federal Crimes
Act of 1790, supra.

         Assimilative Crimes Act of 1866.--The Paul case limited the act as
to time, and the Barney case as to place.  The Congress completely remedied
the situation brought about by the Barney case, and alleviated the problems
raised by the Paul case, by the act of April 5, 1866 (14 Stat. 12, 13),
re-enacting an Assimilative Crimes Act.  This law extended the act to
"any place which has been or shall hereafter be ceded" to the United
States.  It also spelled out what had in any event probably been the
law--that no subsequent repeal of any State penal law should affect any
prosecution for such offense in any United States court.  Accordingly,
though a State penal law was re-pealed that law still remained as part
of the Federal criminal code for the Federal area.

         Re-enactments of Assimilative crimes Act, 1898-1940.--The next re-enactment
of the Assimilative Crimes Act came on July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717).
The constitutionality of the 1898 act was sustained in Franklin v. United
States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910), writ of error dism., 220 U.S. 624.  This
case held that the act did not delegate to the States authority in any
way to change the criminal laws applicable to places over which the United
States had jurisdiction, adopting only the State law in exist-

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           129

ence at the time the 1898 act was enacted, and that the act was not an
unconstitutional delegation of authority be Congress.
         The following statements were made by Chief Justice White in United
v. Press Publishing Company, 219 U.S. 1 (1911), referring to the 1898
statute (page 9):

                 It is certain, on the face of the quoted section, that it exclusively
relates to offenses committed on United States reservations, etc., which
are "not provided for by any law of the United States," and that as to
such offenses the state law, when they are by that law defined and punished,
is adopted and made applicable.  That is to say, while the statute leaves
no doubt where acts are done on reservations which are expressly prohibited
and punished as crimes by a law of the United States, that law is dominant
and controlling, yet, on the other hand, where no law of the United States
has expressly provided for the punishment of offenses committed on reservations,
 all acts done on such reservations which are made criminal by the laws
of the several States are left to be punished under the applicable state
statutes.  When these results of the statute are borne in mind it becomes
manifest that Congress, in adopting it, sedulously considered the twofold
character of our constitutional government, and had in view the enlightened
purpose, so far as the punishment of crime was concerned, to interfere
as little as might be with the authority of the States on that subject
over all territory situated within their exterior boundaries, and which
hence would be subject to exclusive state jurisdiction but for the existence
of a United States reservation.  In accomplishing these purposes it is
apparent that the statute, instead of fixing by its own terms the punishment
for crimes committed on such reservations which were not previously provided
for by a law of the United States, adopted and wrote in the state law,
with the single difference that the offense,

130                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 although punished as an offense against the United States, was nevertheless
punishable only in the way and to the extent that it would have been
punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation remained subject
to the jurisdiction of the State. * * *

         The Assimilative Crimes Act of 1898 became section 289 of the Criminal
Code by the act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1088).  In referring to section
289 the court, in Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937), said
(page 266):

                 Prosecutions under that section, however, are not to enforce the
laws of the state, territory or district, but to enforce the federal
law, the details of which, instead of being recited, are adopted by reference.

The constitutionality of the act was upheld in Washington, P. and C.
Ry. v. Magruder, 198 F. 218 (D.Md., 1912).  The court said (p. 222):

                 Congress may not empower a state Legislature to create offenses against
the United States or to fix their punishment.  Congress may lawfully
declare the criminal law of a state as it exists at the time Congress
speaks shall be the law of the United States in force on particular portions
of the territory of the United States subject to the latter's exclusive
criminal jurisdiction. * * *

         Section 289 of the Criminal Code was subsequently reenacted on three
occasions:

                 1.  Act of June 15, 1933, 48 Stat. 152, adopting State laws in effect
on June 1, 1933.
                 2.  Act of June 20, 1935, 49 Stat. 394, adopting State laws in effect
on April 1, 1935.
                 3.  Act of June 6, 1940, 54 Stat. 234, adopting State laws in effect
on February 1, 1940.

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           131

         Subsequently the act of June 11, 1940 (54 Stat. 304), extended the
scope and operation of the assimilative crimes statute by amending section
272 of the Criminal Code so that the criminal statutes set forth in chapter
11, title 18, United States Code, including the assimilative crimes statute,
applied to lands under the concurrent as well as the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States.

         Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948.--The present assimilative crimes statute
was enacted on June 25, 1948, in the revision and codification into positive
law of title 18 of the United States Code.  It now constitutes section
13 of title 18 of the Code, and reads as follows:

                 Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter
reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty
of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment
of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction
 of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place
is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or
omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.

         Section 7 of title 18, United States Code, referred to in section 13,
merely defines the term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States," in pertinent part as follows:

                 (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States,
and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place
purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the
legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection
of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

132                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         The language of the present assimilative crimes statute, it may be
noted, does away with the requirement for further periodic re-enactment
of the law to keep abreast with changes in State penal laws.  The words
"by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission" make
such re-enactments unnecessary.  The previously existing section 289
of the Criminal Code, through its several re-enactments, supra, need,
"by the laws thereof, now in force."  Accordingly, under the language
of the present statute the State law in force at the time of the act
or omission governs if there was no pertinent Federal law.  All changes,
modifications and repeals of State penal laws are adopted by the Federal
Criminal Code, keeping the act up to date at all times.

         INTERPRETATIONS OF ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT: Adopts State law.--It is
emphasized that the Assimilative Crimes Act adopts the State law.  The
Federal courts apply not State penal laws, but Federal criminal laws
which have been adopted by reference.
         Operates only when offense is not otherwise defined.--The Assimilative
Crimes Act operates only when the Federal Criminal Code has not defined
a certain offense or provided for its punishment.  Furthermore, when
an offense has been defined and prohibited by the Federal code the assimilative
crimes statute cannot be used to redefine and enlarge or narrow the scope
of the Federal offense.  The law applicable in this

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           133

matter is clearly set out in Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711
(1946), (p. 717):

                 We hold that the Assimilative Crimes Act does not make the Arizona
statute applicable in the present case because (1) the precise acts upon
which the conviction depends have been made penal by the laws of congress
defining adultery and (2) the offense known to arizona as that of "statutory
rape" has been defined and prohibited by the Federal Criminal Code, and
is not to be redefined and enlarged by application to it of the Assimilative
Crimes Act.  The fact that the definition of this offense as enacted
by Congress results in a narrower scope for the offense than that given
to it by the State, does not mean that the congressional definition must
give way to the State definition. * * *  The interesting legislative
history of the Assimilative Crimes Act discloses nothing to indicate
that, after Congress has once defined a penal offense, it has authorized
such definition of it.  It has not even been suggested that a conflicting
State definition could give a narrower scope to the offense than that
given to it by Congress.  We believe that, similarly, a conflicting State
definition does not enlarge the scope of the offense defined by Congress.
 The Assimilative Crimes Act has a natural place to fill through its
supplementation of the Federal Criminal Code, without giving it the added
effect of modifying or repealing existing provisions of the Federal Code.

         The Assimilative Crimes Act has a certain purpose to fulfill and its
application should be strictly limited to that purpose.  On the other
hand, it has been applied when there has been the slightest gap in Federal
law.  In Ex parte Hart, 157 Fed. 130 (D.Ore, 1907) the court, in interpreting
the act of July 7, 1898, said (p. 133):

134                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 When, therefore, section 2 declares that when any offense is committed
in any place, the punishment for which is not provided for by any law
of the United States, it comprehends offenses created by Congress where
no punishment is prescribed, as well as offenses created by state law,
where none such is inhibited by Congress.  So that the latter section
is as comprehensive and far-reaching as the former, and is in practical
effect the same legislation.

         Includes common law.--It has also been held that the Assimilative Crimes
Act adopted not only the statutory laws of a State, but also  the common
law of the State as to criminal offenses.  United States v. Wright, 28
Fed. Cas. 791, No. 16,774 (D. Mass., 1871).

         Excludes statute of limitations.--The Assimilative Crimes Act  does
not, however, incorporate into the Federal law the general statute of
limitations of a State relating to crimes; question on this matter arose
in United States v. Andem, 158 Fed. 996 (D.N.J., 1908), where the court
held that the Federal statute of limitations would apply, the State statute
of limitations being a different statute from that which defined the
offense.

         Excludes law on sufficiency of indictments.--In McCoy v. Pescor, 145
F.2d 260 (C.A. 8, 1944), cert. den., 324 U.S. 868 (1945), question arose
as to the sufficiency of Federal indictments under a Texas statute adopted
by the Assimilative Crimes Act.  The court held (p. 262):

                 Petitioner argues that the question here is controlled by the decisions
of the Texas courts regarding the sufficiency of indictments under the
adopted Texas statute. * * * The Texas decisions, however, are not controlling.
 Prosecutions under 18 U.S.C.A.  468, "are not to enforce the laws of
the state, territory, or district,

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           135

                 but to enforce the federal law, the details of which, instead of
being recited, are adopted by reference." * * *

This is amplified in a discussion concerning the Assimilative Crimes
Act in 22 Calif.L.Rev. 152 (1934).

         Offenses included.--The overwhelming majority of offenses committed
by civilians on areas under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the
United States are petty misdemeanors (e.g., traffic violations,drunkenness).
 Since these are not define them by regulations is limited to a few Federal
administrators, their commission usually can be punished only under the
Assimilative Crimes Act.  The act also has invoked to cover a number
of serious offenses defined by State, but not Federal law.

         Offenses not included.--The Assimilative Crimes act will not operate
to adopt any State penal statutes which are in conflict with Federal
policy as expressed by acts of Congress or by valid administrative regulations.
 In Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Rentzel, 81 F.Supp. 611 (E.D.Va.,
1949), a Virginia statute provided for segregation of white and colored
races in places of public assemblage and entertainment.    A regulation
of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator prohibited segregation at the
Washington National airport located in Virginia.  The airport was under
the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the United States.  The question
presented was whether the Virginia statute was adopted by the Assimilative
Crimes Act, thus rendering the Administrator's regulation invalid.  The
court held, at page 612:

136                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

                 The fundamental purpose of the assimilative crimes act was to provide
each Federal reservation a criminal code for its local government; it
was intended "to use local statutes to fill in gaps in the federal Criminal
Code."  It is not to be allowed to override other "federal policies as
expressed by Acts of Congress" or by valid administrative orders, Johnson
v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383, * * * and one of those ""federal policies"
has been the avoidance of race distinction in Federal matters.  Hurd
v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34, 68 S.Ct. 847.  The regulation of the Administrator,
who was authorized by statute, Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 686, to
promulgate rules for the Airport, is but an additional declaration and
effectuation of that policy, and therefore its issuance is not barred
by the assimilative crimes statute.

In Nash v. Air Terminal Services, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 545 (E.D.Va., 1949),
decided on the basis of facts existing before the Administrator's regulation
was issued, it was held that the Virginia segregation statute had been
adopted by the Assimilative Crimes Act, and did apply to the National
Airport.  However, it was held that once the regulation was promulgated
the State statute was no longer enforceable at the airport.  The court
said (p. 548):

                 Too, the court is of the opinion that the Virginia statute already
cited was then applicable to the restaurants and compelled under criminal
penalties the separation of the races.  The latter became a requirement
of the federal law prevailing on the airport, by virtue of the Assimilative
Crimes Act, supra, and continued in force until the promulgation, on
December 27, 1948, by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics of his regulation
expressing a different policy. * * *

         When lands are acquired by the United States in a State for a Federal
purpose, such as the erection of forts, arsenals or other public buildings,
these lands are free, regardless of their

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           137

legislative jurisdictional status, from such interference of the State
as would destroy or impair the effective use of the land for the Federal
purpose.  Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created
by the Federal Government.  Their exemption from State control is essential
to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within
the sphere of its delegated powers.  Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525 (1885); James v. Draveo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
         In providing for the carrying out of the functions and purposes of
the Federal government, Congress on numerous occasions has authorized
administrative officers or boards to adopt regulations to effect the
will of Congress as expressed by Federal statutes.  For example, the
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make rules and regulations
for the management of parks, monuments and reservations under the jurisdiction
of the National Park Service (16 U.S.C. 551); the Administrator of General
Services is authorized to make regulations governing the use of Federal
property under his control (40 U.S.C. 31a); and the head of each Department
of the Government is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with laws, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers
and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining
to it (5 U.S.C. 22).  The law is well settled that any such regulation
must meet two fundamental tests: (1) it must be reasonable and appropriate
(Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); International
Ry. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 (1922); Commissioner of Internal

138                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

Revenue v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 98 (C.A. 7, 1953); Krill v. Arma Corporation,
76 F.Supp. 14 17 (E.D.N.Y., 1948)), and (2) it must be consistent not
only with the statutory source of authority, but with the other Federal
statutes and policies (Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, supra; International
Ry. v. Davidson, supra; Johnson v. Keating, 17 F.2d 50, 52 (C.A. 1, 1926);
In re Merchant Mariners Documents, 91 F.Supp. 426, 429 (N.D.Cal., 1949);
Peoples Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636, 640 (D.C.App., 1947), rev'd. on
other grounds, 333 U.S. 426 (1948)).
         It may be assumed that a Federal regulation in conflict with a State
law will nevertheless fail to prevent the adoption of the State law under
the Assimilative Crimes Act, or to terminate the effectiveness of the
law, unless the regulation meets the fundamental tests indicated above.
 However, there appear to be no judicial decisions other than the Rentzel
and Nash cases, supra, which both indicated a regulation to be valid
that touch upon the subject.
         No reported judicial decision appears to exist upholding the effectiveness,
under the Assimilative Crimes Act, of a primarily regulatory statute
containing criminal provisions.  Liquor licensing laws, zoning laws,
building codes, and laws controlling insurance solicitation, when these
provide criminal penalties for violations, are such as are under consideration.
         On the other hand, no judicial decision has been discovered in which
it has been held that a regulatory statute of the State which was the
former sovereign was ineffective in an area under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Federal Government for the

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           139

reason that the Assimilative Crimes Act did not apply to federalize such
statutes.  Several cases have from time to time been cited in support
of the theory that the act does not apply to criminal provisions of regulatory
State statutes, but in each case the decision of the court actually was
based on other grounds, whatever the dicta in which the court may have
indulged.
         Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), involved an attempt
by a State body to license and control importation and sale of liquor
in an area under partial (denominated "exclusive" in the opinion) Federal
jurisdiction, where a right to impose taxes had been reserved by the
State.  While the court found unenforceable by the State the regulatory
provisions of State law attempted to be enforced, it seems clear that
it did so on the ground that the State's reservation to tax did not reserve
to it authority to regulate, taxation and regulation being essentially
different; there was no question involved as to whether the same regulatory
statutes might have been enforced as Federal law by a Federal agency
under the Assimilative Crimes Act.
         Petersen v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (C.A. 9, 1951), cert. den.,
342 U.S. 885, decided that legislative jurisdiction had been transferred
from a State to the United States with respect to a privately owned area
within a national park, and on this basis the court held invalid a license
issued by the State, contrary to Federal policy, for sale of liquor on
the area.  As in the Collins case, this was a disapproval of a State
attempt to exercise State authority in a matter jurisdiction over which
had been ceded to the Federal Government.
         In Crater Lake Nat. Park Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com'n, 26 F.Supp.
363 (D.Ore., 1939), the court interpreted the Collins case as holding
that "the regulatory features of the

140                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

California Liquor Act are not applicable to Yosemite National Park,"
and called attention to the similarity in the facts involved in the two
cases.  But in the Crater Lake Nat. Park Co. case there was raised for
the first time, by motion for issuance injunction, the question whether
the Assimilative crimes Act effects the federalization of regulatory
provisions of State law; this question the court did not answer, holding
that its resolution should occur through a criminal proceeding and that
there was no ground for injunctive relief.
         The case of Birmingham v. Thompson, 200 F.2d 505 (C.A. 5, 1952), like
the Collins and Petersen cases, resulted in a court's disapproval of
a State's attempt to exercise State regulatory authority in a matter
jurisdiction as to which had been transferred to the Federal Government.
 Here it was a municipality (under State-derived authority, of cause)
which sought to impose the provisions of a building code, particularly
the requirement for a build its incidental fee, upon a Federal contractor,
and the court held that a State reservation of taxing power did not extend
to permit State control of building.  Again, there was involved no question
as to whether the Assimilative Crimes Act federalized State regulatory
statutes.
         In the case of Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944),
there was involved a State seizure of liquor in transit through State
territory to an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction.  The court's
decision invalidating the seizure was based on the fact that no State
law purported to prohibit or regulate a shipment into or through the
State, there was raised the question whether the Assimilative Crimes
Act effected an adoption of  State law in the Federal enclave, which
might have had the effect of making illegal the transactions involved.
 The court made clear that it was avoiding this question (p. 391):

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           141

                 Were we to decide that the assimilative crimes statute is not applicable
to this shipment of liquors, we would, in effect, be construing a federal
criminal statute against the United States in a proceeding in which the
United States has never been represented.  And, on the other hand, should
we decide the statute outlaws the shipment, such a decision would be
equivalent to a holding that more than 200 Army Officers, sworn to support
the Constitution, had participated in a conspiracy to violate federal
law.  Not only that, it would for practical purposes be accepted as an
authoritative determination that all army reservations in the State of
Oklahoma must conduct their activities in accordance with numerous Oklahoma
liquor regulations, some of which, at least, are of doubtful adaptability.
 And all of this would be decided in a case wherein neither the Army
Officers nor the War Department nor the Attorney General of the United
States have been represented, and upon a record consisting of stipulations
between a private carrier and the legal representatives of Oklahoma.

While two justices of the Supreme Court rendered a minority opinion expressing
the view that the Assimilative Crimes Act adopted State regulatory statutes
for the Federal enclave and made illegal the transactions involved, the
majority opinion cannot hereby be construed, in view of the plain language
with which it expresses the court's avoidance of a ruling on the question,
as holding that the Assimilative Crimes Act does not adopt regulatory
statutes.
         The absence of decisions on the point whether the Assimilative Crimes
Act is applicable to regulatory statutes containing criminal provisions
may will long continue, in the general absence of Federal machinery to
administer and enforce such statutes.  In any event, it seems clear that
portions of such statutes providing for administrative machinery are
inapplicable in Federal enclaves; and in numerous instances

142                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

such portions will, in falling, bring down penal provisions from which
they are inseparable.

         UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS ACT OF 1940:  The act of October 9, 1940
(now 18 U.S.C. 3401), granted to United States commissioners the authority
to make final disposition of petty offenses committed on lands under
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States, this providing
an expeditious method of disposing of many cases instituted under the
assimilative crimes statute.   By 28 U.S.C. 632, national park commissioners
(see 28 U.S.C. 631), have had extended to them the jurisdiction and powers
had by United States commissioners under 18 U.S.C. 43001.
         The view has been expressed that under this act United States commissioners
are not authorized to try persons charged with petty offenses committed
within a national monument, a national memorial park, or a national wildlife
refuge,  because of the fact that United States held the particular lands
in a proprietorial interest statue, in accordance with its usual practice
respecting lands held for these purposes, and the act authorizes specially
designated commissioners to act only with respect to lands over which
the United States exercises either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.
         It is interesting to note that the act of October 9, 1940 (54 Stat.
1058), of which the present code section is a re-enactment by the act
of June 25, 1948, was introduced as H.R. 1999, 76th Congress.  A similar
bill (H.R. 4011) without the phraseology

                                 CRIMINAL JURISDICTION                           143

"or over which the United States has concurrent jurisdiction" was passed
by the House of Representatives in the 75th Congress.  When the bill
was reintroduced in the 76th Congress, the above-quoted words were included
at the special request of the National Park Service, since only a small
number of national park areas were under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, and without some language to provide for the trial
jurisdiction of commissioners over petty offenses committed in the other
areas the benefits of the proposed legislation could not be realized
in many national parks.
         The words "concurrent jurisdiction" were suggested because they were
understood as including partial (or proprietorial) jurisdiction and as
consisting essentially of that jurisdiction of the Federal Government
which is provided by the Constitution, article IV, section 8.  In fact,
for a number of years, a proprietorial interest status as exercised over
permanent reservations by the United States was understood among attorneys
in the Department of the Interior as "concurrent jurisdiction."  This
construction has never been placed on the term "concurrent jurisdiction"
either by the courts or by Government agencies generally, and at least
in recent years the Department of the Interior has not so interpreted
the term.
         In this connection, it should be noted that the Department of the Interior
in the past considered obtaining, in collababoration with other interested
Federal agencies, legislation which would authorize United States commissioners
to try petty offenses against the United States, regardless of the status
of the jurisdiction over the Federal area involved.

144                              LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

         The Committee has given consideration to broadening the powers of United
States commissioners by authorizing them to act additionally on lands
over which the Government has a proprietorial interest only.  In the
Committee's conclusions and recommendations, it was recommended that
the powers of commissioners also extend to any place "* * * which is
under the charge and control of the United States."